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1. Introduction 
In March 2011, peaceful protests in Syria against the regime of President Bashar 
al-Assad were violently crushed. This event marked the start of a particularly 
violent civil war in which, according to estimates by the United Nations, more than 
250,000 people have been killed to date.1 In addition, millions of Syrians have fled 
their country.2 At the same time, there is a considerable group of people who have 
decided to travel to the conflict area. Initially, it mainly concerned people from 
surrounding Arabic countries. They were soon followed by people from EU 
Member States, Turkey, Russia and even countries such as Australia, the United 
States and China. During the past few years, the number of foreigners has risen 
drastically. Current estimates of the number of people travelling to Syria and Iraq 
from the European Union range from 3,8503 to more than 5,000.4 The number of 
Dutch people is currently estimated at 260 men and women. They have been 
travelling to the conflict area since 2012.5 Some of them were killed in Syria or 
Iraq (42), while others (approximately 40) returned to the Netherlands after some 
time.6 
 These Syria travellers, as well as those who made unsuccessful attempts to 
travel to Syria, are high on the political and administrative agendas. A considerable 
number of national and international reports and publications focus on the 
backgrounds and motives of western fighters in Syria and Iraq. Their involvement 
in serious human rights violations has also been a point for attention. A subject 
much less written about is the daily lives of foreigners at or behind the front. One 
of the reasons for this is the dangerous situation in the country. Only a handful of 
journalists and scientists were brave enough to conduct local studies. Also, it is 
often not possible to come into contact with people in Syria by telephone or via the 
                                                 
1 United Nations, 2015 
2 UNHCR, n.d. 
3 Neumann, 2015 
4 The Soufan Group, 2015:12  
5 NCTV (2016)  
6 Ibid.  
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Internet. Sometimes technology simply does not allow for it, in other cases it led to 
major safety risks for the people involved. 
 The limited picture of daily life in Syria is a big obstacle when trying to 
answer relevant social and legal questions. What is life like in Syria for the average 
Syria traveller? For instance, is leaving the country for Syria in practice equal to a 
life as a foreign fighter or are there other options too? These are some of the key 
questions addressed in this report.7 
 
1.1 Explanation 
The aim of this study is to get a picture of the living conditions of Dutch people in 
areas in Syria that have not been controlled by the al-Assad regime since 2014. 
This study is based on publicly available sources such as reports, media articles, 
social media (Twitter and Facebook) and weblogs. In addition, we analysed legal 
dossiers and interviewed academics, government employees, social workers, 
journalists, family members of Syria travellers and others who were able to give us 
an insight into the living conditions in Syria. Examples of themes that were 
discussed during these semi-structured interviews include the combat, working and 
living conditions, income, leisure activities and family life (see appendix B). The 
principal methodological deliberations in respect to this study are discussed in 
further detail in chapter four. 
 When reading this report, a number of important things should be taken 
into consideration. First, this is an exploratory study. This means that it is an initial, 
yet thorough exploration of a research topic for which there exists little literature. 
Although the researchers feel that in general, the picture of life in Syria and the 
activities of Syria travellers are properly substantiated, some subjects were more 
difficult to report on. In some cases, there was not enough information available or 
it would have demanded more time to reveal certain aspects of the daily lives of 
Dutch Syria travellers. Given the limited time frame of this study (from October to 
                                                 
7 This publication of this report does not include the paragraph with the formal study assignment. 
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December 2015), this proved impossible. The report explicitly states when 
information proved to be insufficient in order to reach certain conclusions, or when 
sources contradicted each other. 
 Second, it is important to keep the dynamic nature of the conflict in mind. 
Since 2011, the position of nationalist or secular rebels who revolted against 
corruption and human rights violations by the al-Assad regime has weakened 
considerably, partly in view of the emergence of Islamic groups such as Jabhat al-
Nusra (JaN)8, the Islamic Front and Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).9 In 
addition, the Kurds in the north of Syria now also play an important role and 
various countries and organisations outside of Syria have (directly or indirectly) 
started to get involved in the fight. The primary focus of this study lies on the 
calendar year of 2014. One central development during that year was the formation 
of the caliphate by ISIS. In the summer of 2014, the Consultative Council (Majlis 
al-Shura) of ISIS proclaimed a transnational ‘Islamic state’ on the territory of Syria 
and Iraq, with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as caliph. Muslims from across the world 
were called to settle in this area (hijra) and to contribute to the continued building 
and expansion of this state. The formation of the caliphate had major consequences 
for life in these areas. Life in the caliphate is subject to strict rules. Various 
institutions have been set up too, for instance for the daily government of the 
territory and the enforcement of new laws. This makes it possible to paint a 
relatively uniform picture of local daily life in some areas. It is a lot less easier for 
other areas and organisations. This may be because rebel groups form part of joint 
coalitions or because government does not have priority (yet) and people are 
primarily engaged in defending or conquering territory.  
                                                 
8 On 28 July 2016 the leader of JaN announced that the organisation was henceforth called Jabhat Fath al-Sham 
(The Front for the Conquest of Syria). This implied a change of strategy, which will be discussed in chapters 2 and 
10. Given the fact that the primary focus of this report is the year 2014, we will predominantly refer to the 
organisation as Jabhat al-Nusra.  
9 This organisation has been referred to in various ways during the past few years (examples include: ‘Islamic 
State in Iraq and the Levant’ (ISIL), ‘Islamic State in Iraq and Syria’ (ISIS), more recently as ‘Islamic State’ and 
in Arabic as ‘ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah fī 'l-ʿIrāq wa-sh-Shām’ shortened to Da’ish or Daesh). For the sake of 
readability of this report, the authors have opted to consistently use the abbreviation ISIS. 
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 Third, and in part related to the above, living conditions in 2014 can 
considerably differ depending on one’s exact location (both at the frontline and in 
the hinterland). We have tried to pay attention to this in our study as much as 
possible. We must note however, that we only discuss areas were Dutch nationals 
are reasonably likely to stay. A similar choice was made with regard to the 
treatment of specific organisations in this report (see chapter three). 
 Fourth, for this study we have decided to use neutral terms such as ‘Syria 
travellers’ for persons who left the Netherlands for Syria since 2011 with the 
intention of joining the armed conflict and/or to live there. While realizing these 
terms do not always fit the contemporary security discourse, these terms do offer 
scope for studying the probability of certain roles of foreigners in Syria. The term 
foreign fighter will be used only when it explicitly concerns people who are 
directly involved in the armed conflict. We have explicitly avoided the emotionally 
charged term ‘terrorist’ in this report. 
 Finally, it is important to emphasise that the initial study paints a general 
picture of the daily lives of Syria travellers in 2014. The reason for this is that the 
report was written for specific court cases of Dutch nationals who left for Syria in 
the year 2014. This means there may be specific current situations for which our 
findings do not apply. However, in this translated version we regularly refer to the 
current political and military developments (for example in paragraph 2.4). 
    
1.2 Note on the authors 
For this study, Professor Ruud Peters (professor emeritus in Islamic law, 
University of Amsterdam), Professor Edwin Bakker (professor in 
(counter)terrorism, Leiden University) and Daan Weggemans MSc.(doctoral 
candidate, Leiden University) were appointed expert witnesses by the District 
Court in Rotterdam. The role of Roel de Bont MSc. (Leiden University) in this 
project was that of researcher. The authors would like to thank those who were 
prepared to share their knowledge and experiences with us. The authors would also 
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like to thank Ruben Kon and Noora Kinnunen for their supporting work during this 
project. 
 
1.3 Reader’s guide 
This report consists of two parts. The first part of this study relates to a general 
description of the conflict in Syria and the principal parties involved (chapter two), 
and the phenomenon of Syria travellers (chapter three). We will also discuss the 
research methodology (chapter four). 
The second part of the report gives an overview of the main empirical insights we 
obtained about daily life in Syria. After a general introduction, the administration 
and prevailing laws and regulations in areas under the control of certain 
organisations are described (chapter five). The next chapters provide a picture of 
various other aspects of the daily lives of Dutch people in Syria, in areas controlled 
by ISIS. Chapter six for instance, deals with the initial period after Dutch Syria 
travellers have arrived in Syria and their subsequent deployment by the various 
groups there. Chapter seven discusses the social aspects of life under ISIS. The 
next chapter focuses on the way in which Syria travellers support themselves 
(chapter eight), before moving on to things such as infrastructure and other 
facilities in these areas (chapter nine). In chapter ten we make a comparison with 
life in areas that are controlled by other organisations (Jabhat al-Nusra in 
particular). The main findings are summarised in the conclusion (chapter eleven). 
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2. The map of the conflict 
In 2011, peaceful protests in Dera’a against the Syrian regime of President Bashar 
al-Assad were violently crushed. This event proved to be a milestone in a process 
that would ultimately result in a civil war with hundreds of armed parties.10 In 
addition, many foreign states have also become directly or indirectly involved in 
the conflict over the years. The regime of Bashar al-Assad for instance is supported 
by Lebanon, Iran and, recently, Russia. Opposition parties on the other hand 
receive support from Saudi Arabia, the United States, Turkey and Qatar, among 
others. As Saudi Arabia and Iran are arch enemies, the conflict in Syria also shows 
all sorts of aspects of a war by proxy.  
Another important factor in the conflict is the emergence of salafi jihadist 
groups such as JaN and ISIS. In 2013, the latter extended its activities from Iraq to 
Syria, which in 2014 resulted in the creation of a caliphate in parts of both 
countries. Because of the role of the Sunni jihadist movements, the conflict also 
has a sectarian character, with Sunnites standing opposite Shiites and non-Islamic 
minorities.  
 The Kurds also play a particular role in this war. During the conflict, they 
managed to capture an area in the north of Syria. However, given the focus of this 
report, we will not discuss this any further. Finally, the conflict is characterised by 
the large number of foreigners travelling to the conflict area. This is discussed in 
more detail in chapter three. The remainder of this chapter will generally discuss 
the political and military aspects of the conflict in Syria and Iraq that are most 
important for this study.  
 
2.1 The run-up to a civil war 
At the end of 2010, the population of Tunisia revolted. Other Arabic autocracies 
soon followed. This series of revolts and protests later came to be known as the 
Arab Spring. The first ‘successes’ occurred at the start of 2011: the Tunisian 
                                                 
10 See also Cafarella & Casagrande, 2015; Blanchard et al. 2014:3 
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president, Ben Ali, fled the country and Egyptian president Mubarak stepped down. 
This context offered the Syrian population an opportunity to express their 
dissatisfaction. Syria, which had been under the control of the al-Assad family 
since 1970, had been characterised by high unemployment figures, high inflation, 
limited vertical mobility, corruption, restricted political freedom and a tough 
government for many years.11 Nevertheless, the prevailing opinion was that the 
Syrian police state on the one hand and the fear of the population for sectarian 
violence on the other would prevent an uprising.12  
Indeed, attempts by young activists at the start of 2011 to start a revolution 
fell on deaf ears. The protests were fuelled when a group of students were arrested 
and tortured in Dera’a in March 2011 for scrawling an anti-regime motto on the 
wall of a school building. Protests also started in other cities more or less around 
the same time. Heavy-handed police action was the standard answer of the Syrian 
authorities. This caused the protests to spread to neighbouring regions. A month 
later, protests that started off as confrontations with local state representatives had 
turned into a national protest against the Syrian regime as a whole.13 Despite a 
number of promised concessions by the Syrian government, the population 
continued its protests. In response, the Syrian army was deployed on a large scale 
to crush the protests in April 2011. This heralded a new phase of the conflict: 
armed resistance started to overshadow unarmed resistance.14 Syria entered a civil 
war, with various rebel groups fighting government troops – and each other – for 
the control over villages, cities and the countryside.  
 
2.2 Oppositional factions 
The oppositional factions mainly consist of nationalists, jihadist movements and 
local groups.15 The nationalists are mainly represented by the Free Syrian Army 
                                                 
11 Sharp & Blanchard, 2012:1 
12 Ibidem 
13 Ismail, 2014:539 
14 Kahf, 2014:556 
15 Benotman & Naseraldin, 2014:1. For an approach of the opposition parties, see also: Cafarella & Casagrande, 
2015 
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(FSA). This movement, which was formed in July 2011 by deserters from the 
Syrian state army, was the first party to fight against the Syrian regime. From that 
moment, other opposition parties also picked up their weapons. The organisation 
subsequently faced competition mainly from emerging jihadist groups. An armed 
uprising offered jihadist movements the opportunity to increase their influence in 
Syria, especially given their, up to then, virtually negligible role in the relatively 
peaceful revolutions of the Arab Spring.16 The jihadist camp in Syria now 
comprises various groups waging jihad against the al-Assad regime. However, 
there are large differences among these groups. Relationships between the groups 
are characterised by both collaboration and infighting.  
 In addition to salafi jihadist movements, ethnic groups are also involved in 
the conflict. The Kurds play a key role in this category. The Peshmerga, PKK 
(Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê) and YPG (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel) have won 
(back) terrain from ISIS on several fronts, with their role in liberating the Yazidis 
and recapturing Kobane probably being among their best-known actions. 
The oppositional factions in Syria, can be divided into two groups on the 
basis of their ideology and strategy: the thawrī (revolutionary) groups and the salafi 
jihadist groups. Both categories aim to overthrow the current regime of Bashar al-
Assad. The thawrī groups also want to realise their objectives within the existing 
boundaries of Syria and are prepared to accept assistance from foreign states. This 
in contrast to the salafi jihadist factions, which ultimately pursue a Sunni Islamic 
transnational order and who are not or barely prepared to accept help from existing 
states, because those states also form part of the transitional order that is being 
fought.17 The areas where these coalitions and militia operate are discussed in more 
detail below. For a better understanding of the geographical positions and changes, 
a number of maps are included in appendix C.  
 
 
                                                 
16 Benotman & Naseraldin, 2014:1 
17 The classification is based on International Crisis Group, 2014 
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Thawrī groups 
The composition of the thawrī camp is highly fragmented and fluid. It concerns 
relatively small groups that form fragile coalitions. One of the most important 
movements is the Free Syrian Army (FSA, Al-Jaysh al-Suri al-Hurr) which was set 
up by deserted officers in the summer of 2001. In September that year, the group 
merged with a similar organisation: the Free Officers Movement (Harakat al-
Dubbat al-Ahrar). The FSA supported the Syrian National Council since its 
formation at the end of 2012. A large number of militia fight under the standard of 
the FSA, with a reasonable degree of autonomy. The majority of fighters are 
Sunnis (estimated at 90%), but there are also Alawite, Shiite and Druze militia. 
Until February 2014, the FSA was led by Salim Idris, followed by Abdullah al-
Bashir. In 2013 and 2014, when JaN and ISIS gained considerable victories, a 
sizeable group of FSA fighters deserted to these organisations. There are few 
foreigners who fight within the FSA. There are a couple of Arab fighters and some 
mercenaries from the Balkan (Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo). The FSA is active in the 
west of Syria, particularly in the south and north, near Aleppo. Their main aim is to 
overthrow the al-Assad regime. Given the ambitions of ISIS, FSA militias often 
face battle against ISIS fighters too. Guerrilla tactics are often used in the fight 
against the regime, which are not aimed towards the goal of occupying territory, 
but rather at weakening the state army by attacking supply lines and undermining 
army morale.18 
In the north, the thawrī factions collaborated in the National Coalition for 
Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, in which the Supreme Military 
Command (SMC) played an important role. In southern Syria, thawrī factions 
collaborated in Al-Jabha al-Janūbiyya (Southern Front). These ‘umbrella 
organisations’ comprised factions of various ideologies. Some have only one 
conviction: that the regime needs to be overthrown. Others clearly have Islamic 
ideas they want to realise within the boundaries of today’s Syria – with or without 
the support from other states. Such organisations include Jaysh al-Islam (Army of 
                                                 
18 Enders & Landay, 2012 
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the Islam)19 and Ahrar al-Sham (full name: Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiyya, 
the Islamic Movement of the Free Men from the Levant).20  
Among other things, the power of the umbrella organisations over the 
individual militias with regard to operational planning, coordination and 
collaboration lies in their contacts with other states – and as such their ability to get 
military equipment into Syria. In the south, this is coordinated with Jordan. In the 
north, military support comes from various countries, via Turkey. In contrast with 
the border between Jordan and Syria, the border between Turkey and Syria is 
porous. Militia and coalitions of militia continuously fight over the control of that 
border.  
The power of the National Coalition and the SMC weakened in the autumn 
of 2014, also as a result of the agreements made by the US and UN to free Syria 
from chemical weapons. The US applied pressure on the SMC to take part in the 
negotiations, which were also attended by the regime of al-Assad. This undermined 
the legitimacy of the SMC and as such that of the National Coalition. Also, it now 
became clear that the US were not prepared to support the opposition with military 
interventions. In response, anti-Western Islamic groups within the thawrī factions 
gained more supporters and became increasingly influential. Furthermore, many 
thawrī groups were more prepared to work alongside an organisation such as JaN. 
Eventually, in late November 2014, a number of important Islamic factions set up 
their own umbrella organisation: al-Jabha al-Islamiyya (Islamic Front). Participants 
included important Islamic factions, some of which used to be associated with the 
SMC, such as Liwa al-Tawhid (the Banner of Monotheism) , Jaysh al-Islam (The 
Army of Islam), Suqur al-Sham (the Falcons of the Levant) and Ahrar al-Sham 
(The Free Men of the Levant). The Islamic Front is anti-Western, aims for 
application of the sharia, collaborates with both thawrī and salafi jihadist groups 
                                                 
19 A coalition of Islamic militia that are mainly active in the area around Damascus, until recently led by Zahran 
‘Alllush, who was killed recently. The organisation is assumed to receive financial support from Saudi Arabia 
(Oweis, 2013). 
20 A coalition of Islamic militia, the numbers of which are estimated at 10,000 to 20,000 men, and which is one of 
the most important coalitions in addition to the FSA (The Economist, 2013). 
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and opposes any negotiations initiated by the West.21 Therefore, at first glance, the 
difference between thawrī organisations and salafi jihadist groups has become less 
clear in various aspects.  
 
Salafi jihadist groups 
The salafi jihadist camp consists of ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra (full name: Jabhat al-
Nusra li-Ahl al-Sham [Front for assistance to the population of the Levant]) and a 
number of smaller militia associated with Al Qaeda. The best-known group within 
this camp, ISIS, controls large parts of eastern Syria and the north-west of Iraq. 
What we now know as Islamic State has undergone several name changes over the 
years. The origins of the organisation lie in the movement set up by Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi in 1991, Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (Group of the Monotheism and the 
Jihad). After that, continuous organisational changes caused the organisation to 
change its name from Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), Islamic 
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and finally Islamic State (IS). In 2010, control of ISI 
– which was quite weak by then – fell into the hands of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. 
Under his regime, the organisation managed to secure large parts of north-west 
Iraq. In order to gain control in Syria, he allowed Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani to set 
up a local department of Al Qaeda in that country at the end of 2012. This new 
movement would be known as JaN (also known as al-Nusra Front [or support 
front]). This military organisation was successful from the start, conquered 
considerable parts of Syria and received support from the population. Soon there 
were frictions between ISI and JaN. In 2013, al-Baghdadi announced the formation 
of ISIS; a new movement that originated from the merger between the Iraqi ISI and 
the Syrian al-Nusra Front. This unilateral announcement was renounced by al-
Jawlani. Al-Jawlani distanced himself from Baghdadi by swearing allegiance to Al 
Qaeda which had also taken up a critical position towards ISIS. As a result, JaN is 
also regarded as the Syrian branch of Al Qaeda. This rift did not stop ISI’s advance 
to Syria however; al-Baghdadi sent reinforcements from Iraq and was supported by 
                                                 
21 International Crisis Group, 2014 
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defecting al-Nusra fighters – ISIS was a fact. The rift between JaN and ISIS 
resulted in fights, with JaN being driven out of east Syria and ISIS gaining control 
of the cities of Raqqa and Deir-al-Zor. During that same period, the latter also 
captured the Iraqi city of Mosul.  
JaN, which had become active as an independent organisation after the rift, 
shifted its activities to the west: the Aleppo region, the province of Idlib, the city of 
Damascus and the Golan Heights. It attacked Syrian government facilities and 
nationalist or secular rebel groups that were being supported by the United States. 
JaN collaborated with the important Islamic rebel group Ahrar al_Sham and units 
of the FSA. In 2014, JaN controlled dozens of cities, set up sharia law courts and 
granted social facilities only (see paragraph 5.7). Although at certain times in 2014 
there still was some form of collaboration on the battlefield between JaN and ISIS, 
it had gone by 2015.22 The flaring battle between these two parties was not just a 
battle for power and territory; it was also a battle of two strategies. Both 
organisations ultimately wanted to set up an Islamic state. ISIS wanted to do this 
by first capturing an area, establishing an Islamic administration and then 
overthrowing the regime of al-Assad. For JaN, the latter has first priority – which 
means the movement finds it easier to work alongside other opposition groups. As 
a result – see also the previous paragraph about the rapprochement by thawrī 
groups to JaN – JaN plays an important role in the north. Additionally, support for 
these groups is biggest among the Sunni population – most of whom live in this 
region. JaN’s support is smaller in the south. Nevertheless, the organisation still is 
of importance there as well. For instance, structural suicide attacks ensure that JaN 
appears to have a bigger effect than other (thawrī) groups, which shy away from 
such actions. Another aspect is that JaN has considerable assets of its own. It is not 
restricted by political demands from other countries, so it can carry out most of its 
own plans. Thirdly, JaN receives a lot of local support, because many of their 
leaders (and troops) are Syrian. This stands in contrast to ISIS, whose leaders (and 
                                                 
22 Stanford University, n.d. 
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troops) are mostly ‘foreigners’. And finally – even though this applies to many 
other groups as well – it has emerged that the leadership of the al-Nusra Front is 
flexible and prepared to enter into ad-hoc coalitions when this is favourable from a 
military standpoint.23 
On 28 July of 2016 JaN’s leader al-Jawlani announced in a video message 
that the organisation henceforth would be named Jabhat Fath al-Sham (JFS) Front 
for the Conquest of the Levant) and that the bonds with Al Qaeda had been 
severed. This made it easier for JaN to cooperate with other oppositional groups. 
Moreover, they probably hoped that this would result in its acceptance as a bona 
fide rebellious group by the US and that the latter would stop attacking them.24 
 Another important player in the jihadist field is ISIS. During the past few 
years, ISIS has been capturing territory in order to establish an Islamic state there. 
If other groups are in control in such areas, ISIS will try and eliminate them. The 
fact that an Islamic state is more important to ISIS than overthrowing the al-Assad 
regime is demonstrated, among other things, by an overview of the battles fought 
by ISIS in 2014: in 13% of the cases they were fighting the state army, in 64% of 
the cases they were fighting other oppositional militias (and in 23% of the cases it 
was different or not specified).25 June 2014 is a milestone in the history of ISIS: the 
Consultative Council of ISIS appointed Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi caliph and ISIS 
territory was now a caliphate. The caliphate was given a new name, ‘Islamic State’, 
to underline its general character. This increased ISIS’ appeal for foreign 
volunteers. Proclaiming the caliphate went hand in hand with a call to Muslims to 
come to this state and to reinforce it (hijra).26 This gave foreign volunteers a 
religious justification to come to Syria. Through expanding, Islamic State also got 
                                                 
23 International Crisis Group, 2014  
24 Beemsterboer, 2016 
25 Omar & Vinograd, 2014 
26 Hijra means emigration. According to the sharia, Muslims are recommended to leave the area of non-believers 
and to emigrate to an area controlled by Islam. If they cannot practise their religion, such emigration is compulsory 
(Peters, 1982). 
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hold of areas that were home to minorities such as Christians and Yazidis27. The 
legal scholars of ISIS based themselves on the classical texts of Islamic law to find 
rules how to treat these groups. As for the Christians, the new regime looked for 
answers in the sharia rules of the dhimmīs. People could either convert to Islam or 
stick to their own faith, on the condition however that they would accept ISIS’ 
authority, were prepared to pay a special tax and complied with all sorts of 
restrictive laws.28 The situation for Yazidis was even worse: they were given a 
choice between conversion to Islam or death for men. Women and children were 
regarded as slaves and allocated among the fighters who had captured their 
territory.29 Although ISIS has lost territory since the second half of 2015 to Kurdish 
organisations in the north of Syria and to regime forces in the west (such as around 
Palmyra) and in Iraq, they still control large, populated areas.  
 
2.3 The sectarian conflict 
From 2006 until his death in 2010, ISIS, under the name of Islamic State of Iraq, 
was led by Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi. He published a pamphlet entitled ‘Our Credo’ 
(`Aqīdatunā), which mainly consisted of a list of groups that should be regarded as 
apostates (i.e. those that could not anymore be regarded as Muslims and could as 
such be killed). They were not just the police officers and soldiers employed by the 
Iraqi state and persons who took their disputes to the secular courts (not to sharia 
courts), but also all Shiites (consistently referred to with the pejorative term al-
Rāfida, the Renouncers [of the true teachings]). This is still a fundamental 
document for Islamic State (see also paragraph 5.1).30 Due to the important role of 
                                                 
27 A Kurdish-speaking religious group in northern Iraq of some hundreds of thousands of people. Although their 
religion is influenced by Islam, Yazidis are not regarded as Muslims. Under Ottoman regime, they were regarded 
as dhimmis, just like the Christians. 
28 The non-Islamic subjects of the Islamic state who had to pay a special tax, jizya, in exchange for protection. ISIS 
imposed rules on the Christian minority of Raqqa, which rules were mostly based on the agreement between the 
second caliph of the Islam (Omar ibn al-Khattab, r. 634-644) with the residents of Jerusalem (Peters, 2015:207-
210). 
29 ISIS does not acknowledge the Yazidis as dhimmis (see: Dabiq, 2014). For the ISIS document about the 
treatment of female slaves, see Peters, 2015:211-216. 
30 For an English translation, see Peters, 2015:196-200. In 2015, a new Credo (Hādhā `aqīdatunā wa-manhajunā 
[this is our credo and our programme]) appeared, discussing the theology in more detail, but still calling the Shiites 
and supporters of secular ideologies deserters (see Al-Tamimi, 2015e). 
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the Sunni salafi jihadist movements, the civil war in Syria was getting a more and 
more sectarian character. From the first actions of Islamic State in Iraq, it was clear 
the Shiites were regarded as the main enemy. There was an important political 
reason for this: under Saddam Hussein’s regime, the Sunnis had been in power, 
despite the fact that the Shiites formed a larger part of the population. After the 
occupation by the US and the military coalition, the Shiites came to power. They 
monopolised the most important administrative and army positions. The 
government, dominated by Shiites and led by Shiite Nuri al-Maliki (prime minister 
from 2006 until 2014), generated high levels of animosity among Sunnites and as 
such it created a breeding ground for Sunni jihadist movements. By now, a large 
number of important military and administrative positions in the Islamic State were 
taken up by Ba'ath administrators and former officers from the Iraqi army.31 There 
were frictions between Sunnis and Shiites in Syria too, something JaN and ISIS 
exploited. The al-Assad regime is rooted in the Alawite minority group and the 
repressive administration of the state was and still is dominated by Alawites. This 
led to tension between Sunnites and Alawites. As the regime is now supported by 
Shiite Iran and the Shiite Hezbollah movement from Lebanon, the Sunni militia 
also have a tendency to regard all Syrian Shiites as the enemy. 
 
2.4 Notes on the conflict post 2014 
Since 2014, the fighting in Syria has continued tenaciously. During this period, 
ISIS has been steadily losing ground in Syria, mostly to Kurdish forces in the 
North. In contrast, JaN – which, since July 28, 2016, operates under the flag of 
Jabhat Fath al-Slam – has gained territory in the West. Meanwhile, the US-led 
coalition has continued its air campaign, with Russia following similar steps by 
starting its own32. In contrast to the US-led coalitions’ efforts, the objective of the 
                                                 
31 Abu Haniyeh, 2014; Atwan, 2015:140; Fromson & Simon, 2015 
32 After the Russian Parliament approved the Kremlin’s decision, the first air strikes were carried out above Syria 
on September 30, 2015. Moreover, in August 2016 Russia intensified its campaign by agreeing with Teheran to 
use the Hamadan air base in northwest Iran to execute its operations. See: Cockburn, 2015; Bertrand, 2016. 
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Russian air campaign is to support the Assad regime, which ostensibly includes the 
targeting of rebel groups backed by the West.33 
Due to increasing pressure from Russian-backed Syrian regime forces, 
Arab-Kurdish alliances backed by the US-led coalition, and rebel forces, ISIS has 
lost 14% of its territory in Iraq and Syria in 2015. This development continued in 
the first half of 2016, where a further 12% was lost.34 Whereas ISIS once 
controlled 126 key cities and facilities in Syria and Iraq, it has lost almost over half 
of these locations over the past year. For example, since 2014, ISIS has lost nearly 
all its positions near the Turkish Syrian border.35 Furthermore, it has also lost 
multiple cities and plants in the South and East.36 However, in the summer of 2016, 
the organisation still had a nearly continuous hold along the Euphrates river in the 
North and East of Syria. In the meantime, it is trying hard not to lose strongholds 
like Deir al-Zour and Raqqa which are subject to frequent attacks by Syrian regime 
forces. 
Possibly due to the US-led coalition’s focus on ISIS, JaN has been very 
effective in 2015, seizing the city of Idlib, Jisr al-Shughur and surrounding towns 
in the same province. This allowed them to disrupt regime supply lines.37 By 
changing its name to Jabhat Fath al-Sham, JaN allegedly broke all affiliations with 
any external entity. Nevertheless, it remains difficult to say with certainty what the 
effect of the secession will be. It also remains to be seen to what extent the 
secession will generate any distance between the new organisation and its parent 
organisation al-Qaeda, given the complex ideological, historical and personal links 
between them.38 According to experts the secession might facilitate Jabhat Fath al-
Sham’s efforts to create new alliances.39 
                                                 
33 Bellingcat, 2015; The Guardian 2015b; The New York Times, 2015; Entous, 2016; Loveluck, 2016. 
34 The Guardian, 2016 
35 Among others Tell Abyad, Kobane, Manbij, Tel Hamees and the Tishreen Dam. See: Almukhtar, 2016. 
36 The most important are Palmyra in the Southeast, the Badia Cement plant in Southern Syria and Hasaka and the 
close by Kabiba Oil Field in the East of Syria. See: Almukhtar, 2016. 
37 Stanford University, n.d.; Dearden, 2015. 
38 Alami, 2016. 
39 Alami, 2016 
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Meanwhile, Kurdish forces have been able to carve out a considerable 
piece of land at the Syrian-Turkish border, overtaking many ISIS- and government-
controlled cities. YPG’s political wing has subsequently claimed the Northern area 
of Syria as the autonomous federation of Rojava.40 Since 2016, this region has had 
to defend itself from multiple threats, including jihadist groups, Syrian government 
forces, and endure Turkish shelling. More recently, it had to defend against a 
Turkish invasion near its borders.41 
In the north, the city of Aleppo remains a vicious battleground for 
government-, rebel- and jihadi forces. Described as a ‘circle of hell’42 it is currently 
the centre of a large humanitarian crisis.43 Homs remains primarily under Syrian 
government control, although fighting continues in the east of the city. In the 
capital city of Damascus fighting also persists, although the Assad regime 
seemingly controls the largest part of the city. 
In terms of collaboration, new coalitions emerged after 2014 in both the 
thawrī and salafi jihadist camps. For instance, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) 
was established on 11 October 2015, with its own political wing, the Syrian 
Democratic Council. Made up of, amongst others, the Kurdish YPG and YPJ – the 
female wing of the YPG – and the Arab Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa, the SDF became 
the official defense force for the autonomous region of Rojava and is supported by 
the US-led coalition. In March 2015, the Army of Conquest was set up as a joint 
command center of Islamist rebels in organisation such as JaN – now Jabhat Fath 
al-Sham – and Ahrar al-Sham are taking part. 
On  a final note, while the civil war continues in Syria, it seems as if there 
is also a proxy war being fought between the US and the Gulf States – supporting 
moderate rebels – on one side and Russia, Iran and Hezbollah – supporting ISIS – 
on the other. Since the beginning of the US-led air campaign in 2014 until 
February 2016, 23.000 targets have been struck and between 26.000 and 27.000 
                                                 
40 Aljazeera, 2016a 
41 In August of 2016 Turkey launched military assault on in northern Syria, around Jarablus. See: Turbeville, 2016; 
Aljazeera, 2016b 
42 Amnesty International, 2015 
43 Tahhan, 2016 
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ISIS fighters have been killed, with approximately ⅓ of these losses taking place in 
Syria.44 In March 2015, this estimate was much lower at 8.500 killed ISIS 
fighters.45 
                                                 
44 U.S. Department of Defense, n.d. 
45 Starr, 2016 
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3. The phenomenon of Syria travellers 
One of the typical characteristics of the Syrian conflict is the large number of 
foreigners that have joined one of the fighting parties. The International Centre for 
the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR, affiliated with King’s 
College in London) estimated the number of foreign fighters at more than 20,000 in 
2015.46 According to American intelligence, that number rose to almost 30,000 by 
the third quarter of 2015.47 As such, the conflict in Syria and Iraq has created the 
biggest mobilisation of foreigners since 1945. The majority of these muhajirin 
(emigrants) come from the Middle East. A significant minority of these emigrants 
originate from the West (about 260 of them are Dutch48).  
The majority of Dutch Syria travellers join salafi jihadist organisations49 – 
ISIS and JaN (and affiliated groups) in particular.50 A number of Dutchmen and 
Belgians were initially involved in smaller jihadist militia.51 After some time, many 
of them joined the ranks of ISIS or JaN. Sometimes because they decided to defect, 
other times because their group ceased to exist, or because their group became part 
of these organisations in their entirety, in the form of close coalitions or 
otherwise.52 Dutch former soldier Salih Yahya Gazali Yilmaz swapped his position 
at Jund al-Aqsa, a party affiliated with JaN at the time, for a position with ISIS, 
because he felt this organisation was much more transparent and sincere.53 Since 
the caliphate was proclaimed by ISIS in June 2014, there are only few signals of 
Dutch and Belgian travellers that subsequently travelled to Syria and did not join 
ISIS.54  
                                                 
46 Neumann, 2015 
47 Schmitt & Sengupta, 2015  
48 NCTV, 2016 
49 Barrett, 2014; General Intelligence and Security Service, 2015:18; Database De Bont et al., 2015. 
50 Gates & Podder, 2015; Database De Bont et al., 2015; Database and correspondence Van Ostaeyen; NCTV, 
2014 
51 Such as Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen, Suqur al-Sham and Jabhat Ansar al-Din (Database De Bont et al., 2015; 
Database and correspondence Van Ostaeyen) 
52 International Crisis Group, 2014; Benotman & Blake, n.d. 
53 Terrorism Monitor, 2015 
54 Database De Bont et al., 2015; Database and correspondence Van Ostaeyen 
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Nationalist or secular rebel parties (see also chapter two) such as the FSA 
found it hard to manifest themselves as a decisive alternative. In contrast, the 
aforementioned jihadist organisations have for instance more money and other 
resources at their disposal. Their ideology also has a global character (fighting for a 
global community and, in the case of ISIS, global expansion – which is reflected in 
the motto baqiya wa tatamaddad: [ISIS] continues to exist and expands), which for 
many foreigners seems more appealing than group that are more locally focused, 
such as the FSA.55 This may explain why, as far as can be detected, no Dutch 
people have been active in the FSA.  
  Further down in this paragraph, we will discuss possible explanations for 
the phenomenon of Syria travellers. The aim is not to conclude the heated social 
and scientific debates about this subject with an all-encompassing explanation. We 
only try to map out the factors regarding these people by means of a number of 
existing insights. 
 
3.1 Reasons for travelling to a conflict area 
Many studies have been conducted that try to identify possible factors that could 
explain why people travel to faraway areas of combat. Nevertheless, there is no 
clear-cut answer to the question of what motivates people to decide to leave for 
Syria or Iraq to fight or live there. Many possible explanations for fighting are 
derived from literature about the causes of terrorism – another subject that causes a 
lot of discord. We know less about what motivates travellers to leave for reasons 
other than for fighting or to be involved in a combatant group – for instance about 
the growing number of women who are travelling to the area of conflict.56  
The main thing is that there is no unambiguous profile of ‘the Syria 
traveller’.57 A person can often have various motives for travelling to Syria. 
Nevertheless, certain shared patterns can be detected, from which we can derive 
                                                 
55 Barrett, 2014; Gates & Podder, 2015 
56 See for instance Bakker et al. 2015 
57 Among other things, see Weggemans et al., 2015; De Bont, 2015; Bakker et al., 2013 
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apparent factors that play a role when it comes to ‘travelling’. When mapping out 
these factors, we make a distinction between push and pull factors. Some of the 
reasons for travelling to Syria or Iraq are events and circumstances that prompt 
people to leave their home country (push factors). On the other hand, international 
conflicts and incidents may have a major appeal (pull factors). These international 
dimensions mean that many of the causes for travelling to Syria or Iraq are outside 
the Dutch context. Ultimately, the choice to leave for Syria or Iraq mainly seems to 
be the result of a combination of social, ideological and practical factors – which 
are not necessarily the same for everyone and which can have both a repelling and 
appealing effect.  
Focusing on these factors, it seems setbacks and problems experienced in 
daily life and a perceived lack of future perspective are recurring themes. Various 
researchers and other professionals have detected circumstances among Syria 
travellers such as growing up in deprived areas, a low or low to average social 
economic background, an average or lower level of education, trouble at school or 
work, a difficult integration process, brushes with the law, having been under the 
supervision of youth care, and having experienced or perceived all sorts of 
injustices towards them.58 These kinds of experiences of political social injustice 
may cause a person to feel that, as members of a certain social group, they are not 
allowed to belong (discrimination) and are not able to belong (unemployment, 
poverty and oppression) and then decide they do not want to belong.59 Leaving for 
Syria or Iraq may offer a way out. Nevertheless, it appears that the social economic 
profile of a person alone is not enough to explain why someone leaves for Syria or 
Iraq60 – not only because this decision is not always related to a lack of integration 
or a perspective of a positive future, but also because there are a lot of individuals 
with the same profile who decide not to go to Syria or Iraq.61  
                                                 
58 See for instance Weggemans et al., 2015; Malfait et al., 2014; De Graaf, 2014 
59 Schuyt, 1997:21 
60 Coolsaet, 2015 
61 Van San, 2015 
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Other factors seem more relevant in this context. They may be related to a 
search for a sense of purpose (such as looking for an identity or goal) and selective 
incentives (such as wanting to belong or the need for excitement, violence and 
adventure).62 Jihadist groups can fulfil such strong internal motives. In addition to 
the appeal of combating groups in Syria or Iraq, the social dynamics of groups in 
the immediate environment can also play an important role. People are strongly 
influenced by their social environment. Ideas, feelings and behaviour are, for an 
important part, determined by the interaction with this environment.63 The choice 
to join the jihad can be the result of group pressure or group think. One example of 
this, is the story of a group of friends from Wolfsburg, Germany of whom an 
estimated 20 individuals decided to leave for Syria in 2013.64 
Also, in many cases, religious or ideological motives play a role. A lot of 
Syria travellers mention the moral obligation to protect the ‘umma’ (the global 
Islamic community), the duty to obey the caliph and live in the caliphate (hijra), 
and to strive for martyrdom. 
The above analysis – although it is not suitable as a basis to make 
predictions or for profiling purposes – to some extent seems to apply to both 
travelling to Syria or Iraq with the intention to take part in the armed jihad and to a 
potential departure without violence-related motives. On the one hand, many of 
these factors can act as a breeding ground for violent radicalisation.65 Persons will 
be susceptible to (indoctrination of) jihadist ideology and they will be increasingly 
open to a role as fighter with a jihadist group. In that case, the armed conflict 
(jihad) is regarded as a manifestation of opposition and resistance against injustice, 
as a way out, but also as a means to realise certain personal wishes. On the other 
hand, the factors set out above can in theory also result in a growing ideological 
orthodoxy and social alienation, but to a lesser extent in the need to use violence in 
                                                 
62 Stern & Berger, 2015 
63 Veldhuis & Staun, 2009:42 
64 Die Welt, 2015; Neumann (personal correspondence following presentation [‘Jihadistische dreiging tegen het 
Westen. Is er een weg naar een oplossing?’] on 16/12/2015 in Rotterdam) 
65 Weggemans & De Graaf, 2015 
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the realisation of his or her goals.66 Seen from this perspective, the same 
ideological and social ideas, social processes and social and personal needs could 
also result in (the desire for) a journey to Syria with a goal other than taking direct 
part in the armed jihad – such as a desire to form part of an Islamic community 
where the sharia is observed. Regardless of someone’s motives when travelling to 
Syria, the central theme is the increased distancing from the usual social ties and 
ideas. 
 
3.2 Why go to Syria or Iraq? 
One explanation why the Syrian civil war has mobilised so many foreigners is a 
combination of typical characteristics of this conflict.67 First, the repressive actions 
of the Syrian government towards the population play a role. Relatedly, the failure 
of the international community to take action against this, media reports and the 
moral duty to protect the umma as referred to earlier are also of relevance in this 
regard, contributing to the influx of travellers to Syria. Secondly, it had been 
relatively easy to get to Syria.68 Crossing the border from Turkey was simplified as 
jihadist parties controlled parts of the Syrian side of the Turkish-Syrian border. 
This however no longer applies. In the current situation, the border regions in Syria 
are under the control of Kurdish and other oppositional forces. Third, as the rebels 
have control over considerable parts of Syria and Iraq, it is quite conceivable that 
no fighting takes place in all of these areas. This offers the opportunity to 
(partially) avoid violence, and it makes the destination attractive for a bigger group 
(such as women, children or others who are not directly suitable to take part in the 
combat). Fourth, from a historical and theological perspective, Syria is quite 
important. In Islam, Syria (the town of Dabiq) is regarded as the place where the 
world will end (Malahim). Add to that today’s reality of the caliphate and the duty 
to swear allegiance to the caliph. As a final point, the conflict in Syria and Iraq 
                                                 
66 Weggemans, 2013 
67 Hegghammer, 2013 
68 Boeke & Weggemans, 2013; Gates & Podder, 2015
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(following previous international conflicts in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Chechnya) 
provides an opportunity for jihadi around the world to bring their ideals into 
practice.69  
These typical characteristics of the conflict act as powerful pull factors. 
The total number of push and pull factors are set out in the paragraphs above and 
are often mentioned in propaganda. This is also another explanation for the large 
number of foreigners involved in the Syrian conflict: more than ever before, the 
jihadist parties use (social) media to distribute propaganda material.70 
 
3.3 The role of the media and propaganda 
The use of (social) media by the fighting parties has been discussed a lot. Larger 
organisations such as ISIS, JaN and to a lesser extent (members of) the Islamic 
Front71 have an extensive media strategy. ISIS’ official media channel al Hayat and 
JaN’s official media channel al Manarah al Bayda mainly produce propaganda in 
the form of professionally edited HD videos. For instance, ISIS produces an 
average of 2.5 videos each day.72 ISIS also regularly releases a magazine in English 
(Dabiq) and it produces songs (nasheeds) and videos, news items, photo reports 
and audio messages.73 ISIS also has its own radio and TV station.74  
In addition to official channels, information about ISIS, JaN and affiliated 
parties is also distributed online by individuals. For instance, (foreign) fighters or 
locals who live in areas controlled by these organisations share information about 
their lives on Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Google+, Tumblr and Telegram.75 
Their posts may be related to their daily lives, such as eating and recreation, but 
also to the fight that they are part of.76 For instance, in September 2014, a Dutch 
                                                 
69 De Roy van Zuijdewijn & Bakker, 2014 
70 Benotmann & Naseraldin, 2014 
71 Islamic Front is mainly known as a coalition of militia, which means the material of the coalition is aimed at 
combat rather than at other aspects of daily life.  
72 Respondent 3 
73 Gates & Podder, 2015. ISIS also publishes Turkish, Russian and French translations of the English magazine 
Dabiq . See also: Gambhir, 2014 
74 Withnal, 2015; The Telegraph, 2015 
75 Khayat, 2015 
76 Grol et al., 2014 
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member of JaN in Syria posted a video on his Facebook page, criticising the 
American aerial war in Syria and enticing people to “forcefully act against the 
Dutch government”.77 Such videos may have a considerable impact on Dutch 
sympathisers.78 
The content of the official media campaigns (often videos and photo 
reports) of ISIS and JaN is, in general term, rather similar.79 First, a substantial part 
of the messages from ISIS and JaN have themes such as violence and war.80 
Images from the front line, reports of battles, beheading, executions, burnings and 
drownings are regular features in the videos.81 The Quilliam Foundation analysed 
the media output of ISIS for a month, and concluded that about 40% of the material 
is highly violent or military.82 JaN also regularly releases videos with images from 
the front lines.83 Foreign fighters are often given prominent roles in these videos. 
They are called to contribute to the battle.84 Al-Baghdadi for instance used an audio 
message to call Muslims around the world to emigrate to the caliphate and take up 
arms.85 Muslims who are unable to move to the caliphate are urged to plan attacks 
in their countries of residence.86 Also, many of the videos and photo reports offer 
(positive) insights into local daily lives. Such scenes can be subdivided into (1) 
economic issues (images of food production, corn fields, markets), (2) social issues 
(social facilities such as hospitals and clean drinking water), (3) spare time and 
relaxation (friendships among fighters, close family ties, parks, playgrounds with 
children, people swimming and playing football) and (4) religious activities 
(images of mosques, sharia schools, singing fighters, Koran studies).87 One 
                                                 
77 Reedijk, 2014 
78 Berger & Morgan, 2015 
79 Respondent 3 
80 Important videos for ISIS’ propaganda are ‘Salil al-Sawarim’ (‘The clattering swords’, four parts, made between 
mid-2012 and mid-2014), ‘A Message for America’ (June 2014) and ‘A Message for the Allies of America’ 
(October 2014). These and numerous other videos were uploaded to YouTube and other social media.  
81 Ali, 2015; Abu Haniyeh, 2014; Stern & Berger, 2015:101-126 
82 Winter, 2015b 
83 Zelin, 2015 
84 NCTV, 2015a 
85 MEMRI, 2015 
86 NCTV, 2015b 
87 Respondent 3 
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example is the 8-part ISIS documentary, with the captured British reporter John 
Cantlie showing there is hardly any crime, that hospitals are good and that daily 
life is busy and cheerful.88 Although ISIS has been devoting attention to these 
subjects since mid-2014, JaN did not structurally start until 2015.89 
ISIS and JaN try to reinforce their legitimacy as controlling party in Syria 
by means of the aforementioned forms of propaganda. On the one hand, they 
produce images of a violent nature and on the other, their videos show how the 
organisations introduce structure and justice to the country.90 Videos and photo 
reports with insights into daily life gained popularity particularly after 2015. 
Popular videos such as Al Hayat’s series ‘Stories of the land of the Living’, Al 
Hayat’s series of documentaries with John Cantlie and Al Hayat’s popular video 
‘Eid Greetings from the Land of Khilafah’ were all released in 2015. Propaganda 
about daily life often still contains violent elements. Videos often contain images 
about daily life and images of executions or the front line. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
88 The Guardian, 2015a 
89 Respondent 3 
90 Gates & Podder 2015 
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4. Methodological approach 
This chapter describes the methods and approach of this study. It sets out the 
process of data collection (how and which data was collected) and discusses the 
validity of the study.  
 
4.1 Background and focus of the study  
The conflict in Syria (and Iraq) has received a lot of attention from journalists, non-
governmental organisations and scientists since 2012. The formation of the ISIS 
caliphate in 2014 intensified this attention. Newspapers, TV broadcasts, study 
reports, scientific magazines and social media regularly report about the role of 
violence in daily life in Syria in general and the caliphate in particular. In addition, 
there was a lot of interest in the role of foreigners in this conflict. What prompted 
them to move to this area of conflict and what threat do they pose for the local 
population abroad and for their previous countries of residence?  
 Compared to the subjects mentioned above, other aspects of daily life in 
Syria, the organisational structure of ISIS and JaN and other aspects of life in areas 
no longer under the control of Assad’s regime receive a lot less attention. There are 
several reasons for this lack of publication about daily life. The most significant 
one may be that local sources (journalists in particular) have been running an 
increasingly bigger risk since 2012 and most of them have left the areas of conflict 
by now. A second possible explanation is the nature and scope of the violence. The 
highly violent images and stories from Syria and Iraq receive large amounts of 
attention and as a result, there is limited attention for other aspects.   
 As such, this study is of an exploratory and descriptive nature. Based on a 
small number of publications available and a limited number of interviews with 
experts, we have tried to paint a picture of daily life in Syria. We focus on the 2014 
calendar year. Although the conflict in Syria is closely related to the situation and 
developments in Iraq, this study primarily aims to describe the situation in parts of 
Syria. The exploratory nature of this study means that it is not an exhaustive study, 
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but an initial picture of the situation. Despite the fact that a considerable number of 
sources have been consulted in a relatively short research period (between October 
2015 and mid-December 2015), it still concerns a limited number. This has to be 
taken into account when drawing conclusions from this report. 
 
4.2 The research method 
Destination Syria is a qualitative study. Based on open sources, a number of legal 
dossiers and in-depth interviews, we aim to paint a picture of daily life in Syria. 
Among other things, the information from open sources can be traced to 
newspapers, government reports, scientific literature, weblogs and social media 
(Twitter, Facebook and Telegram). This also includes sources in Arabic. The (five) 
legal dossiers we studied form part of previous court cases that related to alleged 
attempts to travel to Syria or Iraq or to alleged involvement in terrorism. Studying 
these dossiers yielded (very) limited useful information for this study.  
A series of ‘semi-structured’ interviews were also held. Semi-structured 
interviews are held on the basis of pre-set questions, but at the same time they 
allow for enough space to table additional questions and subjects. The order of 
questions asked in the interviews did not follow a pre-determined structure (for a 
list of questions and topics, see appendix B). Semi-structured interviews make it 
possible to talk about complex and sensitive subjects. The researcher can probe 
when relevant information about a certain theme is discussed. This method offers 
the opportunity to vary the way in which certain questions are formulated. Because 
we interviewed people with different social, cultural and professional backgrounds 
for this study – in both English and Dutch – it is possible that certain words and 
concepts have different meanings for the respondents. The possibility to deviate 
from a certain question makes it possible to take these different backgrounds into 
account.91 The analysis of the interviews ultimately focused on their latent content 
                                                 
91 Harell & Bradley, 2009; Weggemans & De Graaf, 2015:19  
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(the underlying meaning) rather than their manifest importance (the specific use of 
words and definitions).  
 
4.3 Selection of respondents 
The respondents for the interviews were selected on the basis of their experiences 
and expertise. We looked for respondents who were living in Syria in 2014, as well 
as for individuals or organisations that were in direct contact with people in Syria 
during this period. In some cases, these individuals were found in our own 
networks. In other cases, we were able to contact them on the basis of information 
from the media, or we came into contact with relevant discussion partners through 
others (convenience sampling). Other contacts were made via social media such as 
Twitter, Facebook and weblogs. 
 During the organisation of the interviews, the short time window of the 
study and the willingness to cooperate proved to be major restrictive factors. Some 
people we interviewed were afraid of the publicity and others feared that by taking 
part in the study, they may become the subject of a legal investigation (after all). 
Some relevant organisations feared for their name as impartial players. Also, the 
number of returning potential Syria fighters (approximately 40) is still limited. 
Making contact with people who are currently in the region also led to problems. 
And, given the dangerous situation in Syria, conducting fieldwork locally was not 
an option. 
 Nevertheless, we conducted a considerable number of interviews with 
national and international experience experts for this study. The total amounts to 26 
(for an overview of respondents, see appendix A). The backgrounds of the 
respondents vary from scientists with an extensive network in Syria or among 
Syrians and people currently staying in the area of conflict, to people with a lot of 
local contacts (whether or not affiliated to one of the combating parties) and 
individuals who lived in Syria for their entire lives and fled the country or 
otherwise.  
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4.4 Validity of the study 
The sources used for this study paint a picture of the living conditions in Syria in 
2014 from different perspectives. During the data gathering, the researchers often 
encountered moments of recognition: fragments that gave an insight into daily life 
had already been discussed during other interviews or encountered in other sources. 
Insights confirmed by several sources may be proof for a bigger validity of the 
findings of this study. In addition, based on the expertise of the respondents, we 
can also derive confidence in respect of the validity of the findings.  
 At the same time, such a study is subject to various restrictions. First, it is a 
study into a situation in the past. Although much of the data is also recorded in 
other sources, the risk of the interviews is that the reconstruction of the situation in 
2014 contains incorrect elements. People may have forgotten things or stored them 
incorrectly. A second potential restriction is that interviews do not tell you all about 
a person’s precise ideas and experiences. A person may have various reasons for 
intentionally telling or sharing a different version of the story on social media than 
the actual event. This study recognises the relative value of the interviews 
conducted. By means of triangulation (combining different methods and sources) 
we have tried to prevent these problems for the validity of the study.  
 While conducting this study it became clear that the amount of information 
and knowledge on the different organisations in Syria greatly diversified. For 
instance, there are relatively many sources about life in the areas controlled by 
ISIS. This is not a disadvantage for this study, as most Dutch people in the region 
(especially after June 2014) have joined ISIS. In contrast, less is known about life 
in the areas controlled by Jabhat al-Nusra. As JaN works alongside many other 
parties and, for now, primarily focuses on the continued combat (and as such to a 
lesser extent focuses on rebuilding a state), daily life in the various areas may differ 
strongly. Nevertheless – insofar as the collected data allows for it – we will paint a 
general picture about the living conditions in areas that are under the control of this 
organisation. In the conclusion, we will also make statements about the different 
roles that persons within these organisations may assume. 
 
 
39 
 
 
 Less is known also about the living conditions in areas that fall under 
smaller salafi jihadist militias or the Free Syrian Army. Yet given the limited role 
of Dutch nationals within these rebel movements, most of these movements fall 
outside the scope of this study. Hence, the lack of information on such living 
conditions in these areas constituted no major obstacle. 
Summary part I 
A characterising feature of the Syrian conflict is its complexity. There are many 
combating parties with different goals and tactics. The position of nationalist or 
secular rebel movements has weakened considerably following the emergence of 
well-organised salafi jihadist groups. Organisations such as Islamic State in Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS) and Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN) and affiliated militia fight not only 
against the regime of al-Assad, but also against the formation of an Islamic state. 
For ISIS, the latter takes priority. For the time being, JaN and the coalition of rebel 
groups it cooperates with primarily concentrate on overthrowing the al-Assad 
regime. Because of these different interests and strategies, there have been regular 
bloody confrontations between these movements.  
 Since 2012, foreigners have been playing an increasingly important role in 
the conflict. Among them are an estimated 260 Dutch men and women. The 
majority of Dutch Syria travellers have joined salafi jihadist groups. Apart from 
ISIS, it mainly concerns Jabhat al-Nusra and sometimes affiliated (smaller) militia 
(such as parties affiliated with the Islamic Front). Many of those who used to be 
members of smaller rebel groups joined JaN or ISIS at a later stage. As far as we 
know, no Dutch men have joined the Free Syrian Army or settled down in areas 
that were under the control of this opposition movement.  
In literature, we can distinguish different reasons to travel to the area of 
conflict. They include ideological, social and practical reasons. A lot of Syria 
travellers feel it is their duty to contribute to protecting the Islamic community 
(umma) and the armed conflict (jihad). In addition, travelling to Syria offers 
prospects of a life full of adventure and camaraderie. Social processes and needs 
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often also play an important role. When the Consultative Council of ISIS named 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi caliph in June 2014, this was another important reason. 
Some Muslims say it is their moral duty to obey this caliph, to settle in this 
caliphate (hijra) and to contribute to the development and expansion thereof. Since 
this ISIS caliphate was set up, a large majority of Dutch Syria travellers joined 
ISIS, according to various sources (or: ‘Islamic State’, as the organisation called 
itself from that moment). Social media may also have played an important role in 
this.  
 Finally, this first part of the study set out the research methodology used.  
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Part II 
The armed conflict can be felt throughout Syria. Attacks, public executions and 
fights have given daily life a violent character in many places. At the same time, 
the situation can vary strongly depending on location and time.92 For instance, from 
August 2014 onwards, ISIS was hit by air strikes carried out by the international 
coalition.93 This changed the living conditions in the areas controlled by ISIS 
considerably. Until then, it was mainly the men who died while fighting on the 
front line. Women and children who stayed at home – or men deployed behind the 
front line – were relatively safe in that initial situation.94 As such, during the period 
prior to the bombings by the coalition, any danger for ISIS mainly manifested itself 
around the front lines. As the coalition started to deploy fighter jets near such front 
lines, such as Kobane, Hasaka and Deir el-Zor, the danger only increased. 
However, the bombings were not restricted to just the front lines. Towns and cities 
outside these regions were also targets of air strikes, such as Al-Bukamal and 
Raqqa. As a result, daily life and activities such as buying food in the shops in 
regions that were initially relatively safe were now much more dangerous.95 Hence, 
more than before, also women and children fell victim to the violence.96 Due to 
these bombings, the difference of what forms part of the front line and what does 
not has faded considerably. Unsafety as a direct consequence of the war has 
therefore been perceived throughout the entire caliphate since August 2014.97  
 The second part of this report discusses the living conditions in areas that 
are not controlled by the al-Assad regime – both in front of and behind the front 
lines. Although we said earlier that the difference between life on and behind the 
front line has faded in many areas, we can still identify a number of differences. 
                                                 
92 Respondent 2; Respondent 6; Respondent 7; Respondent 18; Respondent 19; Respondent 20; Respondent 23; 
Respondent 25 
93 The army of the regime of Bashar al-Assad also bombed rebel movements in the preceding period, but due to 
the involvement of this international coalition (consisting of, among others, the United States, Jordan, Saudi 
Arabia and various European countries), the bombings of ISIS in Syria and Iraq were strongly intensified. 
94 Respondent 2 
95 Respondent 25 
96 Respondent 2 
97 Ibid. 
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For instance, duties behind the front lines may differ from those on the front, where 
the emphasis lies on the armed conflict. Regions on the front line are also more 
often faced with a lack of water and power cuts, and the economic consequences of 
the conflict are more significant here. This will be discussed in the next couple of 
chapters. 
Part I showed that most Dutch men and women ended up in areas that are 
controlled by ISIS. The next chapters will therefore start with a discussion about 
the various aspects of the living conditions in ISIS territory. Then, on two 
occasions (at the end of chapter 5 and throughout chapter 10) we will make 
comparisons with daily life in the regions that are under the control of JaN and its 
affiliated organisations. This choice is also based on a practical reason, as 
discussed in chapter 4: based on the amount of information available, we can 
elaborate more on life under ISIS than under other groups. 
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5. Administration and policy in rebel area 
In order to understand the daily course of affairs in an area, it is important to have 
an idea of the administration, the laws and regulations that apply in that area. This 
chapter will discuss the way in which ISIS and JaN administer the areas they 
dominate. We will devote attention to aspects that are relevant to the daily life of 
the population in general and foreign fighters in particular. They include matters 
such as the organisation of the central administration, legislation, the 
administration of justice, maintaining law and order and the military defence of the 
area. We have already indicated that (areas under the control of) the Free Syrian 
Army (FSA) has a limited appeal to Dutch Syria travellers. We will therefore not 
discuss the areas under the control of this organisation and other organisations that 
are not relevant to this study. During this study, we also established (as noted in 
chapter 4) that there is a substantial amount of knowledge and information about 
(areas under the control of) ISIS compared to JaN and affiliated organisations. This 
chapter will therefore start with a description of the administration and policy in 
areas under the control of ISIS. In addition, we will, for each subject and when 
possible, make a comparison with the state of affairs in areas under control of JaN 
and affiliated organisations. 
5.1 Background of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
Islamic State stands out from other rebel movements in the Syrian civil war in that 
setting up an Islamic state takes priority for ISIS. Although Salafi jihadist 
organisations such as JaN or the Islamic Front also ultimately strive to proclaim an 
Islamic state, their efforts are mainly focussed on the battle against the regime of 
Bashar al-Assad and other enemies (such as ISIS). ISIS, in contrast, conquered 
areas not to serve as a basis for military operations against the regime, but as a 
target in itself. This ambition is one of the explanations for the uncompromising 
 44 
 
 
and aggressive attitude of ISIS towards other groups that had settled in the same 
areas.98 
ISIS pursues a state that is established on the basis of a highly orthodox 
Sunni religious doctrine. The sectarian religious substantiation was published in a 
document entitled ‘Our Credo’ (`Aqīdatunā). This document was written by the 
leader of the terrorist organisation Islamic State in Iraq, Abu `Umar al-Baghdadi, 
who was killed in 2010 and who was the predecessor of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. 
Eight out of the nineteen articles in this document declare that certain groups of 
Muslims should be regarded as apostates and that they deserve to die. Among 
others, it concerns Shiites, people who submit their disputes to secular state courts, 
persons who support secular, nationalist and Ba’ath ideologies and individuals who 
collaborate with the (American) occupying forces. The forces of the Iraqi army and 
police are also regarded as apostates, as are all rulers of the states in the Islamic 
world. As for the non-Islamic minorities, the document states that they violated 
their original protection treaty (dhimma) and that they are not entitled to life, 
freedom and property until they have declared to acknowledge the authority of ISI. 
Based on this document, it was religiously legitimate to fight and kill nearly all 
Iraqi civilians.  
When the Syrian civil war broke out in 2011, ISI soon set its sights on 
Syria too. To that end, Jabhat al-Nusra was set up in 2012. However, after a while 
conflicts arose between ISI on the one hand and JaN and Al Qaeda on the other. 
This ultimately prompted ISI to actively get involved in the conflict in Syria and to 
change its name to Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. However, the principles and 
rules previously formulated by Abu `Umar al-Baghdadi continued to be 
authoritative.99 In time, various groups and individual deserters of Islamic militia 
joined ISIS.100 The organisation refused to cooperate any further with other 
                                                 
98 Fromson & Simon, 2015; Al-Tamimi, 2015a 
99 Translated text and explanation, see Peters, 2015:196-200 
100 For instance, in 2013, the militia Usud al-Sunna (Lions of the Sunna) defected to ISIS and hundreds of fighters 
from Islamic groups deserted (including approximately 1,000 from Suqur al-Sham) to ISIS in the summer of 2014 
(Weiss & Hassan, 2015:158-162; Atwan, 2015:127). 
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movements such as JaN and the Islamic Front. The ties with Al Qaeda also came 
under strain as time went by and they were permanently severed in January 2014. 
 
5.2 Strategies of ISIS and state bodies 
At the start of 2013, ISIS had absolute rule in a number of areas in Iraq and Syria. 
It set up its own state organisation in these parts, it fulfilled a number of 
government tasks and provided government services. In addition, it imposes sharia 
standards on the population. In other parts of Syria however, ISIS had to share 
power with other groups. It tried to side-line these other organisations. They also 
organised da`wa (mission) meetings in order to spread ISIS Islam and to make 
contact with local notables. Leaflets were distributed, events were organised for 
young children and schools with an Islamic curriculum were set up for older 
children. Girls were (and are) given the opportunity to go to school in these areas 
(in other words: there was no ban such as the one imposed by the Taliban), 
although boys and girls are strictly separated. In order to gain more support from 
the population, ISIS set up sharia courts, which can impose not just severe 
sentences such as the death penalty, but can also settle civil disputes. As crime and 
a general feeling of being unsafe were wide spread, many people welcomed these 
sharia courts, in the hope of them bringing law and order. ISIS also tried to win the 
hearts and minds of the local population by distributing free or low-priced bread, 
where necessary.101 
This way, ISIS gradually built up a state structure; managed centrally, but 
with a reasonable extent of autonomy for the local authorities. From 2010, the 
organisation was led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in his capacity of emir (ʾAmīr; 
leader or commander) and the Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shura). The 
Consultative Council, with nine to eleven members appointed by al-Baghdadi, 
deals with proposals about appointments of commanders and governors of 
provinces, about policy, crucial issues (such as those in relation to war and peace) 
                                                 
101 Al-Tamimi, 2014c; Caris, 2014 
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and other current affairs. The Council can only make proposals for that matter; it is 
the emir who makes the ultimate decisions.102  
In order to increase the Islamic legitimacy of the state, the Consultative 
Council decided to appoint the leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as caliph in 2014 and 
to name the areas under his control caliphate. This implied that ISIS was the only 
legal Islamic state and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi the only leader of the Muslims.103 In 
the address104 in which the caliphate was announced, Muslims were ordered to 
acknowledge al-Baghdadi as the only legal ruler and to take an oath of obedience 
(bay`a).105 In addition, Muslims were obliged to travel to the caliphate and to 
contribute to the conflict or the development of the caliphate (see also paragraphs 
2.2, 3.1 and 6.2).106 An appeal was made to the Islamic notion of hijra 
(emigration): an obligation – interpreted in different ways for that matter – for 
Muslims who do not live in an Islamic society to emigrate to an Islamic state. The 
combination of proclaiming the caliphate, with the call to emigrate, participation in 
jihad and the development of a true Islamic state are factors that caused ISIS to 
become an appealing to destination for emigration of many Muslims from abroad. 
In the course of 2013 and the first half of 2014, the state structure became 
more pronounced and ISIS carried out more and more state duties via ‘ministries’ 
(diwans). The number of ministries grew in the course of time.107 There were a 
total of 14 in the summer of 2014.108 An overview (see footnote 108 and the 
paragraphs below) of the duties of these ministries gives an impression of the 
                                                 
102 Abu Haniyeh, 2014 
103 For the notion of caliphate, see Bunzel, 2015a 
104 For an English translation, see SITE Intelligence Group, 2014 
105 For the term bay`a, see Wagemakers, 2015 
106 Caris, 2014; Fromson & Simon, 2015 
107 Al-Tamimi, 2015a; Caris, 2014; Haniyeh, 2014 
108 With a view to the importance of Islam and sharia for the legitimacy of the caliphate, no fewer than five 
ministries deal with religious affairs: the Ministry of Spreading of Islam, Mosques and Religious Foundations (al-
da`wa wa-l-masajid wa-l-awqaf), the Ministry of Administration of Justice and Complaints (al-qada’ wa-l-
mazalim), the Ministry of the Religious Police (al-Hisbah), the Ministry of Fatwas and Islam research (al-ifta’ wa-
l-buhuth) and the Ministry of Education (al-ta`lim); there are three that mainly deal with financial and economic 
affairs: the Ministry of Finance (Bayt al-Mal), the Ministry of Mineral Resources (al-Rikaz) and the Ministry of 
Agriculture (al-zira`a). There are two ministries for Warfare (al-Jund) and one Ministry of Security (al-Amn al-
`Amm); and finally four for specific government duties: the Ministry of Information (al-`alaqat al-`amma), the 
Ministry of Beduin Tribes (al-`Asha’ir), the Ministry of Public Health (al-Sihha) and the Ministry of Public 
Services (al-Khidamat).  
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underlying ideas and the way in which ISIS wanted to build the state. ISIS territory 
is divided into provinces (wilayat), where local departments of the ministries 
function. Bureaucracy is largely in the hands of non-Syrians. It concerns not just 
Iraqis who were involved with ISIS from the start, but many other non-Syrians, 
Saudis and Tunisians also have managerial positions.109 Egyptians, Europeans and 
Chechen often fulfil secondary positions.110 
 
5.3 Administration, legislation and enforcement under ISIS 
The main characteristic of an Islamic state, in addition to a caliphate-type of state, 
is the application of the sharia. The organisation of ISIS shows that this is regarded 
as the raison d’être of the state. There are five ministries that deal with the sharia. 
The Ministry of Fatwas and Research deals with the theoretical side. It publishes 
leaflets about issues related to Islam and the sharia. It also issues fatwas about 
practical matters. These fatwas set out the sharia rules for specific cases in the 
fields of law, religion and ethics. There are fatwas about taxation, the law of war 
(treatment of prisoners of war), travelling, games, the behaviour of women, 
smuggling, prescribed clothing, rituals and organ transplants.111  
On a religious level, the Ministry of Education is also important. This 
ministry ‘purges’ the curricula of schools of non-Islamic matters and it develops 
study programmes that mainly consist of the conveyance of religious and sharia 
knowledge. The Ministry of Spreading of Islam, Mosques and the Religious 
Foundation ensures there are no preachers with ideas that violate ISIS’ Islam. 
There are two ministries for the direct application of the sharia: that of the religious 
police (hisbah) and the administration of law and complaints.  
The religious policy falls under the sharia courts and deals with public 
morality and religious behaviour. For instance, police officers check if shops are 
closed during prayer, that people wear demure clothing and that random men and 
                                                 
109 Caris, 2014 
110 Al-Tamimi, 2014b; Caris 2014:23  
111 Bunzel, 2015b 
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women do not engage with each other in public.112 There is also a special female 
police corps called the Al-Khansaa brigade. This brigade mainly checks that 
women wear the prescribed clothing and that they behave decently in public. 
Women who fail to obey the rules may be arrested or flogged on the spot.113  
All non-religious courts have been banned on ISIS territory and have been 
replaced with sharia courts. These courts are authorised to settle civil and family 
disputes and they deal with criminal cases. Sharia courts are known for their 
verdicts that impose corporal punishment such as amputation, stoning and 
crucifixion.114 In addition to resources to fight crime, these courts are also a tool to 
safeguard the power of ISIS. 
Protection of public order and security and the collection of data is the duty 
of the security services, which fall under the Ministry of Public Security (Diwan al-
Amn al-`Amm, often referred to as Amni or Emni). More than other ministries, this 
ministry is dominated by officers from the former security services of Saddam 
Hussein. This organisation is responsible for the security of the caliph, it checks the 
implementation of his decisions and the execution of criminal sentences of the 
sharia courts. Departments for communication with the central government can be 
found in each province. There are also units for political murders, kidnappings and 
extortion.115 The police and the security organisation seem to be using the same 
torture methods that were applied under Saddam Hussein.116 According to reports 
of several Western Europeans intelligence agencies, seen by New York Times, the 
Ministry of Public Security of ISIS, since mid-2014, has been recruiting and 
sending fighters abroad for terrorist actions. This activity seems to had been headed 
by one of the most influential leaders of ISIS, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani117 – who 
is reported to have died late August 2016.118 
                                                 
112 Atwan, 2015:129, 139 
113 Winter, 2015a 
114 Van Ostaeyen, 2013, 2014a, 2014b 
115 Abu Haniyeh, 2014 
116 Amnesty International, 2013 
117 The New York Times, digital edition, 3 August 2016. 
118 Schmitt & Barnard, 2016. 
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Although the sharia is the law of Islam applied by the state, state bodies are 
allowed to issue their own laws and decrees in certain fields. This concerns details 
that are not provided for in the sharia, such as regulations about public health, the 
distribution of medication, education, traffic and economic affairs. ISIS has issued 
legislation in all of these fields.119 There are known state documents with regard to 
regulations about fishing rights, payment of electricity, excavation permits, 
payment for refuse collection, coordinated Friday lectures, vaccinations and 
determination of housing rent.120  
 
5.4 The ISIS army 
There are widely varying estimates about the size of ISIS’ army. They range from 
20,000 to 31,500 mid-2014 (CIA estimate121) to 200,000 (according to Kurdish 
sources122). After the early bombings of ISIS targets in Syria in September 2014, 
the ISIS army suffered great losses. According to some sources, it concerns 
thousands of ISIS fighters, including, according to an Iraqi analyst, 17 of the 43 
high commanders. However, these figures are disputed and deemed to be high.123  
The ISIS army is managed by the Minister of the Army and a military 
council (Al-Majlis al-`Askari), chaired by the minister. There is also a head of the 
general staff. The council consists of the commanders of the various regions – each 
of which accommodate about three battalions of about 300 to 350 men – and of the 
commanders of logistical and specialist departments. The council deals with all 
military issues, such as strategic planning, preparing attacks and field battles, 
monitoring the execution of operations by commanders, management of equipment 
and the distribution of the war booty. Many of the commanders of the second and 
third echelon are officers who originate from the army and security services of 
                                                 
119 Al-Tamimi, 2015a 
120 Al-Tamimi, 2015c, 2015j, 2015k 
121 Sciutto et al., 2014 
122 Cockburn, 2014 
123 Fromson & Simon, 2015 
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Saddam Hussain. These regular soldiers have left a deep mark on what can be 
regarded as a perfectionist education for recruits (see also paragraph 6.1).124 
The equipment of ISIS was largely obtained on the battlefield. Between 
2012 and the summer of 2014, ISIS seized a number of weapons and other 
equipment. A considerable amount of the equipment consists of heavy weapons, 
such as tanks, light and heavy artillery, Humvees and portable anti-tank and anti-
aircraft rockets. Some observers have reported that ISIS also had a number of MIG 
fighter jets. The Syrian air force says it downed two such aircraft in October 2014. 
The United States for that matter declared that there were no indications that ISIS 
had indeed conducted flights.125 
The main tactics of the ISIS army consist of strikes carried out by mobile 
infantry units. They have light vehicles such as pick-up trucks (often Toyotas) with 
artillery, motorbikes and vans to facilitate a quick advance. They also use car 
bombs, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide attacks.126 One element of 
ISIS’ tactics is the ruthless treatment of the enemy. In accordance with the religious 
beliefs of ISIS (see above), Shiites and members of the army and policy of the 
regimes in Iraq and Syria are regarded as apostates who should be sentenced to 
death. This justifies the mass executions, which are recorded on video and then 
distributed (see paragraph 5.4). Suicide attacks also form part of the tactical arsenal 
of ISIS. This too has religious aspects: those who carry out a suicide attack believe 
they become martyrs (shahid) and that they will end up in the highest ranks of 
paradise. In addition, the suicide attacks and the ruthless nature of ISIS’ fighting 
method had a major shock effect on the enemy who, in 2014 in particular, at times 
fled en masse, fearing certain death if ISIS got hold of them. 
ISIS’ army consists of fighters from different backgrounds. The majority of 
soldiers are Iraqis and Syrians, but in addition to these local fighters, there are also 
volunteers who have arrived from outside this area. It is assumed that these foreign 
fighters make up about a third of the entire army. The largest contingent is made up 
                                                 
124 Abu Haniyeh, 2014; Atwan 2015:140; Fromson & Simon, 2015 
125 Westall, 2014 
126 See for instance Fulmer & Rice, 2015; Gutman & Zakaria, 2015; Asher-Schapiro, 2015 
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of Arabs (Saudis, Tunisians, Moroccans and Jordanians). There is also a growing 
group of Russian citizens (Chechen, Dagestani) and Central Asians. Finally, there 
are also some thousands of western Europeans (see chapter 3). The military 
contribution of these foreigners is highly diverse. Some are hardened fighters with 
a lot of experience in war, like Bosnia, Afghanistan and Chechnya, but others lack 
fighting experience.  
There are also major cultural differences. This diversity has positive and 
negative consequences for the army’s effectiveness. The positive consequences 
arise from the fact that these foreigners are highly motivated and are stronger from 
an ideological point of view than local fighters.127 They have left their countries 
with the sole aim to support ISIS. Also, it is in the interest of ISIS that these 
foreign fighters have no local loyalties and ties, but only want to serve the interest 
of ISIS. There is a downside to this however: there is a distinct difference between 
foreign and local fighters in terms of motivation. This may lead to an 
organisational and cultural rift in the army (see also paragraph 7.4). This is a 
challenge for ISIS management. There are stories of clashes between local and 
foreign fighters.128  
 
5.5 Media 
As mentioned earlier in this report, ISIS makes clever use of mass media in order 
to realise its objectives: the ‘electronic jihad’. There is a special Ministry for 
Information (Diwan al-`Alaqat al-`Amma), managed by a Media Council. This 
ministry manages more than 10 media centres and institutes that produce videos 
and organise the use of social media. A lot of videos are intended for Muslims for 
the west and are in English. The message in many videos is twofold: to intimidate 
the enemy by showing them they will be crushed and that the fate of prisoners of 
war is terrifying. On the other hand, they paint a picture of an ideal society ruled by 
the caliph and the fact that the state gives priority to the well-being of its subjects. 
                                                 
127 Gates, 2015; Fromson & Simon, 2015 
128 Ibid. 
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That side is mainly intended for potential recruits.129 Apart from making videos, 
ISIS is also active on Twitter. Tweets reach thousands of followers and as such 
they are a good way of spreading its propagandist messages. Hackers of ISIS have 
also developed viruses that cause Tweets from recipients to be forwarded on 
unknowingly.130 Fighters also send tweets. Nearly all of them have smartphones. 
Still, the organisation does seem to control this in some cases131 (see also paragraph 
3.3). 
 
5.6 ISIS’ finances 
Since 2014, ISIS has mainly served as a state, and more precisely, a belligerent 
state. This means its expenses are considerable, both for warfare and the public 
administration. Furthermore, there are costs for the infrastructure and social 
benefits. This is compensated by substantial sources of income. The Ministry of 
Finance (Diwan Bayt al-Mal) takes care of state finances, which increased 
considerably after the capture of Mosul and other areas in Iraq and Syria. In 
January 2015, the first state budget was published, with € 2 billion in estimated 
income.132 Most of the state’s income comes from the extraction and selling of oil, 
selling and taxation of antiquities, ransom for prisoners, taxes and extortion, 
immovable property rentals and gifts. 
 
Oil 
At the start of 2015, ISIS had a number of important oil fields under its control. 
The running thereof falls under the Ministry of Mineral Resources (Diwan al-
Rikaz), which also deals with the selling and taxation of antiquities. ISIS’ income 
from oil is generally overestimated. The oil fields could yield about 80,000 barrels 
per day, but it is considerably less under ISIS’ control. Important factors that 
reduce production levels are the air strikes and problems with system maintenance. 
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ISIS has tried to hold on to or recruit experienced oil engineers by offering them 
high wages and privileges, but they only succeeded to some extent. In addition, it is 
hard to get hold of spare parts. 
 Most of the extracted oil is used internally: as cheap fuel for the state, the 
army and civilians. Any oil that is not consumed domestically is exported. 
However, as ISIS does not have access to the formal oil market, it is sold by 
smuggling, below market prices. With a view to the risky aspects of oil extraction, 
ISIS is increasingly inclined to hive off the running of the oil fields, to lease the oil 
sources and to levy tax on oil sales.133  
 
Antiquities 
Although ISIS has destroyed numerous antique buildings for reasons of publicity, a 
lot of antique objects were saved for economic reasons. These objects are sold on 
the illegal market. It is unclear to what extent ISIS itself sells antiquities. The 
government does not conduct excavations for antiquities but does give civilians a 
licence to dig them up. These licensees can only sell the antiquities within the 
territory and they have to pay tax on them134  
 
Ransom 
There are now several examples in which ISIS is responsible for kidnapping people 
(especially employees of international organisations and western journalists), 
before they are released in some cases, against payment of a ransom. According to 
estimates, this increased ISIS’ cash flow by 20 to 30 million dollars in 2014. The 
extent of the ransom is often negotiated for insurance companies by specialist 
companies. Sometimes the state of Qatar plays a role. According to plausible 
rumours, it pays a ransom for subjects of certain states, in exchange for political 
favours. The state has not acknowledged that link. Nevertheless, it was striking that 
Qatar was able to open an embassy in Bern, shortly after it had paid 30 million 
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dollars to free a Swiss citizen who had been taken hostage by ISIS.135 Also, ISIS 
often demands ransom for imprisoned members of minorities, such as Christians 
and Yazidis.136  
 
Taxation and extortion 
The boundary between taxation and extortion by ISIS is often vague. ISIS imposes 
the Islamic zakat on Muslims (wealth tax of approximately 5%) and the jizya137 on 
Christians. In addition, ISIS levies tax on fuel, cars, antiquities, and on transported 
goods, also when they are in transit. A considerable source of income for the state 
is formed by the tax on withdrawing cash from bank accounts. Many Iraqi and 
Syrian civil servants are allegedly still being paid by Baghdad and Damascus, via 
banks outside of ISIS territory – although there are also sources that say that the 
Iraqi government stopped this in July 2014.138  
When those civil servants return to ISIS territory with the money they have 
withdrawn, they will have to pay a considerable amount in tax. Like other states, 
ISIS also asks for payment for certain services, such as education and the collection 
of domestic waste. ISIS demands payment from many industrial and financial 
companies (such as private banks), businessmen and shopkeepers. It looks a lot like 
extortion, because the extent of the payments is often arbitrary.139  
 
War booty: Immovable property 
After conquering Iraqi or Syrian territory, all state property falls into the hands of 
ISIS. This concerns for instance agricultural land , buildings and state-run 
enterprises such as state-owned banks. After conquering Mosul, the bank accounts 
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of Christians, Yazidis and Shiites were seized. The (agricultural) rent and business 
revenue also go to ISIS.140  
 
War booty: Movable property 
ISIS distributes the movable war booty obtained after field battles and the conquest 
of areas in accordance with the rules of the sharia. Everything that is taken, is 
handed over to the commander by the soldiers. He (or a state representative) 
distributes this among the soldiers in equal shares (often in money, after selling the 
goods on the ‘war booty market’), after deduction of a fifth, which goes to the 
state. As ISIS acknowledges slavery, prisoners of war and captured women and 
children can form part of the war booty as slaves and they can be sold or 
distributed among the fighters.141  
 
Financial support from abroad 
There are contradicting reports about financial support from abroad. According to 
some authors, rich individuals send (or sent) considerable amounts of money to 
ISIS from the Gulf states.142 
 
5.7 Administration and policy under Jabhat al-Nusra/Fath al-Sham 
In addition to ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra (now Jabhat Fath al-Sham, JFS) is also active 
in Syria as a salafi jihadist militia. Compared to ISIS however, the knowledge of 
JaN’s organisational structure and daily life in areas controlled by JaN is much 
smaller. This is in part a consequence of the fact that JaN is first and foremost a 
combat organisation. Its commander, Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, heads the 
organisation in consultation with the Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council).143 
There often is uncertainty about how the commando structure works. This is a 
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major difference to ISIS, which directly pursues the establishment of an Islamic 
state, with an administration structure that has to be transparent for civilians. That 
is one of the reasons why ISIS’ media system is so extensive. That of JaN is 
smaller: it is less active on the Internet compared to ISIS. Also, their ‘Bureau for 
the Spreading of Islam and Information’ (Maktab al-Da`wa wa-l-Irshad), with 
media centres such as al-Manara al-Bayda’ li-l-Intaj al-i`lami (The White Minaret 
for media production) and al-Basira li-l-Intaj al-i`lami (The Right Insight for 
media productions) mainly publishes printed brochures and leaflets.144  
 The organisation of JaN is not initially focused on managing the people 
living in the areas under its control. In addition, these areas often do not form a 
single whole, rather consisting of different enclaves where multiple militias share 
power. In this section we will explain what is known about the organisation, 
strategy and activities of JaN as required background for the daily life of foreign 
Syria travellers.  
JaN is a militia with an estimated 5,000 to 6,000 fighters. Most of them are 
Syrians who have gained fighting experience in Afghanistan, Iraq and Chechnya, 
for instance. There are also fighters from other Arabic countries, Turkey, central 
Asia and a small number from Western Europe. About 30% of fighters are said to 
be foreign.145 JaN is regarded as one of the best equipped oppositional militia. The 
number of foreigners has fallen since the summer of 2014, because many of them 
defected to ISIS after ISIS proclaimed their caliphate.146 JaN played a major role in 
conquering Raqqa and Deir al-Zor in eastern Syria. In 2013 and 2014, JaN was 
driven from these cities by ISIS. JaN became mainly active in western Syria 
(around the cities of Aleppo and Damascus). Important income of JaN is generated 
by selling oil from the oil wells under their control and by trading equipment and 
ammunition seized on the battle fields. Ransom may also be a source of income.147  
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 Both JaN and ISIS want to set up an Islamic state, but the difference in 
strategy is enormous. For JaN, the toppling of the al’Assad regime takes the 
highest priority, while to ISIS the establishment of an Islamic state comes first. 
Whereas ISIS tries to establish absolute rule in the areas it controls using all 
peaceful and violent means, as a starting point for expanding its state, JaN is 
prepared to work together with other opposition groups in order to end the al-Assad 
regime and to set up an Islamic state (see paragraph 2.2).148 JaN is selective for that 
matter: together with other Islamic militants it attacked opposition groups – 
supported by the US – after the autumn of 2014.149 
Al-Jawlani’s announcement of July 2016 – changing the name JaN to 
Jabhat Fath al-Sham and declaring to have no affiliation to any external entity  – 
was not a clear break with the past when JaN was pursuing al-Assad’s downfall 
and cooperated with other oppositional groups. In his address al-Jawlani 
emphasised these strategical objectives expecting that this would facilitate 
cooperation with other groups and hoping that the US would stop regarding 
JaN/JFS as a terrorist organisation and hence would stop attacking them.  
 In most areas, JaN shares power with other groups. Generally speaking, 
JaN is less ruthless towards civilians than ISIS. For instance, the front has declared 
not to intentionally kill the non-fighting members of unorthodox Muslims 
(Alawites and Druze).150 Although JaN does not want to establish a state right 
away, it does try to offer the government provisions required when the central state 
disappears. Law and order are maintained by applying the sharia. JaN has set up 
sharia courts (Dar al-Qada’) in various areas, which administer justice, also in 
criminal cases. These courts are usually recognised by the other militia with whom 
JaN in many cases shares power over the area. Although JaN applies criminal law 
less ruthless compared to ISIS, JaN also pronounces and carries out cruel 
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punishments (such as stoning).151 These courts can also issue local decrees: 
examples are the separation of boys and girls at school, the subjects to be taught at 
school, the closure of shops that sell billiards tables, table football games and 
computer games.152 They often correspond with the prevailing rules in areas ruled 
by ISIS, as a result of which life in areas controlled by JaN does to some extent 
show similarities with life under ISIS.  
In the various areas under the control of JaN, it has set up departments of 
the Administration of Public Services (al-Idara al-`Amma li-l-Khidamat), which 
mainly organises the supply and distribution of drinking water and electricity.153 
JaN also distributes food and bread when necessary: in order to be able to 
guarantee the latter, it has opened a number of bakeries in Aleppo, for which it also 
supplies flour.154 In the areas controlled by JaN, a considerable number of local 
people show support, other than is the case with ISIS. An important reason is that 
the JaN fighters are mostly Syrians and that its organisation is flexible when it 
comes to working alongside other militia. In addition, the application of the sharia 
has in some cases led to a certain degree of security, without the courts having 
pronounced numerous death sentences (as opposed to what has happened in ISIS 
territory). And concluding, the distribution of food is also positively rated.155 
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6. From border crossing to deployment 
This chapter discusses the first period after Syria travellers have arrived in Syria. 
More specifically, this chapter deals with the different processes followed by 
foreigners when they settle down in areas that are under the control of ISIS. What 
are their potential perspectives within this organisation? 
 
6.1 Arrival in Syria: safe houses and training centres  
Europeans travel to Syria via different routes. Most of them end with a crossing to 
Syria via Turkey. In many cases, this can be specified to a crossing via the Turkish 
city of Antakya or elsewhere via the Turkish province of Hatay156 – a mountainous 
area known for its traditional smuggling routes. The exact recruitment process they 
then follow can differ. After setting foot on Syrian soil, Europeans are welcomed, 
often by a contact person whose name or telephone number they have.157 This 
person takes them to an application centre, or safe house, of ISIS.158 These centres 
are especially intended to receive foreigners and are generally situated just across 
the border from Turkey.159 Where someone is taken depends on his or her 
nationality, origins and knowledge of languages. Dutch men and women (together 
with Flemish Syria travellers) are clustered and accommodated away from those 
from Tunisia, Morocco or France.160 Upon arrival, men and women are separated161 
and they have to surrender their belongings such as their passports, telephones, 
laptops and clothing. These are checked for chips and GPS equipment.162 They are 
given shelter, food and drinks.163 For a maximum period of three to four weeks, 
men are interrogated about their backgrounds and their reasons for coming to 
Syria.164 Questions referring to their names, origins, studies, degrees, skills, 
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ambitions, goals, etc. The answers are filled out in ‘registration forms’, as 
illustrated by the mass leak of such documents in March 2016.165 For precautionary 
reasons, the foreigners will be guarded during this period in the safe house.166 An 
interviewee remarks: 
 
“Can they be trusted? Do they have any [wrong] reasons for 
joining? Will they at one point want to break away from the group? 
So if they went out, there was always a third person going along to 
keep an eye on them.”167 
 
Despite such screening measures, this ‘application procedure’ – especially during 
the early period – can be labelled as an ‘open door policy’: it is relatively easy to 
join the ranks of ISIS.168 However, the requirements to join have become 
considerably stricter over time.169 Some Syria travellers have mentioned the need 
for a recommendation (tazkiyya). In other cases, Syria travellers seem to have 
joined the ranks of ISIS without such recommendation.170 In general, the interviews 
take longer for someone who was involved in another local group prior to this 
period than for a ‘new recruit’. Those who used to be a member of another 
organisation have to complete a process of forgiveness or repentance.171 
After their time in the safe house, the men are taken to training camps.172 
Here, they will stay for consecutive midweeks, possibly with the exception of the 
weekends, when they can visit their wives and children (if applicable), who are 
housed elsewhere during this initial phase.173 In the training camp too, they are still 
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being monitored out of precaution.174 Other than in the safe houses, there is no 
clustering according to origin in the training camps. The Dutch, Belgians, 
Moroccans, Tunisians, etc. all train together. This encourages foreigners, insofar as 
they do not speak the language yet, to learn Arabic; the working language during 
the preparation and execution of military operations, among other things. In 
addition to a language course, these training sessions consist of theological and 
military curricula. Together, they form a “defined, well-organised and structured 
study programme.”175 A training process starts with theological issues that set out 
the basis of the religion. The subject matter then turns more political. A defector 
states that he was taught the ISIS version of Islam: that non-Muslims have to be 
killed because they are the enemy of the Islamic community.176 A lot of value is 
attached to this religious education.177 A sharia exam is said to form part of this 
curriculum, and has to be completed successfully before someone can be fulfil a 
role for the organisation.178 The military curriculum concentrates on physical 
development, dealing with hunger and cold, handling various weapons and 
carrying out combating techniques and strategies.179 Weapon training seems to be 
particularly aimed at learning to use a Kalashnikov, RPG and hand grenades.180 
Other training includes the use of swords181 and sniper rifles.182 A standard day at 
training camp seems to start around 05:30 hrs, with morning prayer183, followed by 
endurance training in the morning and a religious part in the afternoon, ending with 
weapon and combat training.184 Lunch is consumed outside, so they can get used to 
the cold weather.185 During this period, recruits are in principle not sent to the front 
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line. They can be deployed as guards in border areas or at checkpoints (ribaat) 
however.186 This seems to be a compulsory final element of the training; a first 
form of practical experience with combat.187 
The above forms the basis of a training process. However, not every 
process is identical. Based on an assessment of the person’s qualities and 
knowledge beforehand, he will (partially) follow an individual training process.188 
Many will eventually be deployed for duties that match their specific capacities.189 
This means the period spent at a training camp can vary considerably from person 
to person and it may extend from a couple of weeks to a year.190 The average 
training process seems to take about a month and a half to two months.191 On the 
one hand, this assessment may result in a person having to follow more or fewer 
classes of a certain theme compared to someone else.192 On the other, it means that 
after the period at the safe house, people can (in addition or otherwise) specialise 
on the basis of their competencies.193 A person’s wishes may also play a role in 
this.194 These wishes may relate to specific jobs, but also to the choice to carry out 
a suicide attack. In some cases, this seems to have been encouraged.  
Others are asked to, instead of fighting for ISIS in Syria or Iraq, to quickly 
return to their home countries to plot attacks on their home soil. For that purpose, 
ISIS provides them with a shortened training to make the cover story of going on a 
holiday more credible.195 In July 2016, the Dutch General Intelligence and Security 
Service estimates that there are dozens of ISIS operatives in or on their way to 
Europe who might be(come) involved in preparing and executing attacks.196 Thus, 
given the required ‘output’ of the training phase, both the content and the duration 
of the training might differ. In principle however, everyone follows military 
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training and takes an oath of loyalty (bay’a).197 In such an oath, a Syria traveller 
declares that he will carry out all duties assigned to him, regardless of whether he 
thinks they are acceptable or not. According to one of the respondents, this happens 
before the training period.198 
This separation between time spent at the safe house and time spent at a 
training camp is not always that explicit. In certain cases, both phases seem to take 
place almost simultaneously, with the ‘recruit’ being sent to a training camp 
immediately, where he is both interviewed and trained.199 On average, this entire 
starting period between arrival and deployment, regardless of whether it can be 
divided into two phases or not, seems to take about two to three months. During 
that period, the life of a male Syria traveller consists of interviews and training on a 
closed site, where they are strictly monitored by the organisation. This period can 
be physically demanding, which is evidenced by stories from family members 
about Syria travellers losing a lot of weight during this stage.  
 
6.2 Deployment of Syria travellers 
Once the training has been completed, the men are placed in a battalion (katiba) led 
by an emir. These battalions are, for pragmatic reasons, formed on the basis of 
nationality, cultural similarities and language.200 However, lately ISIS has 
dissolved at least several of such ‘national battalions’ due to unintended 
consequences of having homogeneous groups and treating them different than local 
fighters (see paragraph 7.4).201 This development however does not have seemed to 
affect the situation of Dutch and Belgian Syria travellers: they are currently still 
believed to be grouped together in the same unit(s).202 Not only the fighters, but 
also those who, on the basis of their capacities and wishes are mainly deployed for 
duties other than fighting, end up in this military structure. The question as to ‘what 
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do they do there?’ has several answers. For instance, a Dutch young man reassured 
his parents by telling them he was only a chef, and not involved in any combat.203 
Such statements are difficult to verify though, and in general they do not seem to 
reflect reality. On the other side of the spectrum, there are Dutch young men who 
carried out suicide attacks. In between, there is a wide range of other options. 
When asked what jobs you can do in ISIS’ caliphate, one Dutch Syria traveller said 
“anything you want.”204 Most of them will become fighters205, but the possibilities 
to do something else than fight seem to be diverse. Among other things, there are 
jobs in the media (‘mediajihad’) or communications, you can become an engineer, 
a technician, a hacker, a doctor or nurse, you can get a job with the religious police 
or sharia court or, when found unfit to fight, you can become a chef, gravedigger or 
driver.206 The need for such professions can be explained by the fact that many 
people have escaped the violence in Syria. This has resulted in a brain drain and a 
loss of specialist knowledge in the caliphate.207 This means there is a shortage of 
professionals and skilled people. This shortage is also clearly expressed in the first 
speech by Baghdadi, in which he called Muslims to emigrate to the newly 
proclaimed caliphate: 
 
“We make a special call to the scholars, fuqaha’ (experts in Islamic 
jurisprudence), and callers, especially the judges, as well as people 
with military, administrative, and service expertise, and medical 
doctors and engineers of all different specializations and fields. We 
call them and remind them to fear Allah, for their emigration is 
wajib ‘ayni (an individual obligation), so that they can answer the 
dire need of the Muslims for them.”208 
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However, it is difficult to view such jobs separately from the armed conflict.209 
When a person fulfils such a job, it means he can or will no longer be deployed for 
combat. Often it seems to concern a combination, being active in both the media 
and as a fighter.210 Also, ISIS seems to apply conscription.211 Those who are not 
fighters, are reservists. The emir may stipulate they fight or undertake other combat 
activities when deemed necessary212, for instance as soon as a city enters the front 
line or when there is a shortage of fighters. The extent to which this happens, and 
particularly the extent to which a person is deployed to carry out brutalities, is hard 
to gauge. It appears to depend strongly on, among other things, the situations a 
person is confronted with and the commands of his emir. It does seem that in 2014, 
ISIS had less tolerance for those who were not actively committed to the armed 
jihad.213 There are indications that weak or unwanted recruits were killed by 
ISIS.214 They have to demonstrate they form part of ISIS and have to be decisive. A 
hesitant mentality will often be associated with possible espionage.215 It seems that 
reaching a higher level (such as a position as emir or joining the religious police) 
can be particularly associated with cruelties. When someone is deemed 
ideologically suitable, has the right connections and his family has been 
‘approved’, he can, according to an ISIS fighter, receive training on how to carry 
out executions. Beheading and shooting to kill at close range are practised on 
multiple persons. Such ritual executions seem ‘to count’ when someone wants to 
get higher up the ladder.216 Given the fact that some Dutch Syria travellers are “in 
relatively interesting positions” within ISIS217, this suggests that they are guilty of 
such cruelties. Some of the French Syria travellers are also known to have been at 
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the head of a militia or formed part of the religious police.218 There are also photos 
of Syria travellers in supporting positions, such as a Dutch employee at a sharia 
court, posing with amputated heads.219 
Although the majority of foreigners are deployed as fighters, it seems they 
do not fight continuously.220 On the one hand, this is because a considerable 
amount of a fighter’s time is spent on other armed military tasks, such as guard 
duty and patrolling. This may involve combat activities as well as inflicting 
corporal punishment.221 The ribaat for a large part consists of guard duty, 
something that can turn the role of fighter into a “very dull” one at times.222 On the 
other, it is not possible to constantly fight, as periods of combat are followed by 
periods during which there is no combat, offering time off or to carry out another 
duty (such as guard duty or da`wa).223 The emphasis on fighting can particularly be 
seen on the front lines, where they fight against the regime or other rebel groups. In 
areas that lie further away from these front lines and are under ISIS’ control, the 
emphasis is on various other duties. However, the violent dimension of the conflict 
applies here as well. Men, regardless of their position, are expected to carry 
arms.224 Certain jobs are also clearly linked to violence. Officers of the religious 
police (al-Hisbah, see paragraph 5.3) for instance, impose punishment for 
(suspected) violations. Allegedly, a Belgian has headed this religious police in 
Raqqa since early 2015.225 Westerners in general seem to take up a special role in 
ISIS in respect of contact with non-Arabic prisoners and receiving ransom.226  
Although foreign women, like local women, usually take care of the 
household and do not fight227, the use is violence is not just a male affair. Mid-
2015, one young Dutch woman told about her duty: lashing people. “A nice new 
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experience”, she states.228 Although the validity of this statement is difficult to 
gauge, it seems that it is mainly western women who fulfil a role with the Al-
Khansaa brigade (see paragraph 5.3), and that this also includes women of Dutch 
origin.229 Other duties fulfilled by Dutch women who came to this area include 
“cooking for the brothers”230 and distributing online propaganda. Women have an 
increasingly bigger role in the latter in particular.231 Among other things, they play 
an important part in convincing other women to travel to Syria. However, women 
are mainly responsible for looking after their families (see paragraphs 7.1 and 7.2). 
In 2014 and afterwards, the perception among Syria travellers with regard 
to their deployment in Syria appears to be strongly linked to what has been 
described above. According to numerous respondents, men join ISIS – regardless 
of their family situation – in the knowledge that the caliphate has to be defended by 
means of violence.232 “No one is under any illusion that they can live a life without 
soon being deployed for combat, or having to use violence on behalf of IS.”233 To 
that end they will go on training and they know this in advance.234 “They know 
very well what they are getting themselves in to, which is taking part in the violent 
jihad.”235 The argument to travel to ISIS territory with the intention to provide 
humanitarian aid therefore seems highly improbable in 2014 and afterwards.236 In 
addition, Syria travellers are unable to provide humanitarian aid by themselves in 
the caliphate of ISIS; the organisation will ask them to deploy them for ISIS.237 
Non-cooperation will be associated with espionage. Joining ISIS seems to be a 
condition for Syria travellers to travel around the areas controlled by ISIS (and to 
undertake activities, see for instance paragraph 8.1 about employment). 
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7. Daily life from a social perspective 
This chapter discusses the social elements of daily life, starting with the role and 
position of men and women. Following on from this, we will discuss the family 
lives of Syria travellers, after which we will deal with the contrast with the daily 
lives of the local population. In conclusion, we discuss the integration issue. 
 
7.1 The role of men and women 
The role and freedoms of women have changed dramatically in the last few years. 
The abaya was often seen as early as 2013, but in addition, women also often wore 
make-up and they wore ‘modern’ clothes: showing bare skin at the arms and 
knees.238 This changed at the start of 2014. ISIS’ grip on society tightened from 
that moment and such scenarios gradually disappeared.  
The role of a woman starts when she is old enough to get married, which 
can be as young as 9. From that moment, she is expected to serve society from 
behind the scenes.239 A woman's life is therefore primarily aimed at having children 
and looking after her family.240 To that end, women are obliged to stay at home; 
they live sedentary lives. The possibilities to go out alone are limited.241 In such 
exceptional cases, they are obliged to wear a abaya and niqab.242 They can go 
outside only under the supervision of an immediate male member of the family243, 
the only exception being an emergency. The male/female relationship within the 
family is typified by the man’s superiority and the woman’s duty to obey him (in 
the words of the Al-Khansaa brigade: ‘the honour of execution’).244 A woman can 
marry only one man, but a man can have several wives. Furthermore, a man can 
keep a yezidi slave as his concubine, also when he is married. In practice, women 
hardly seem to object to this, probably because of powerlessness or a fear for 
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domestic violence.245 The situation for these yezidi women is completely different 
from the wife’s role set out above. They are regarded as unbelievers with whom no 
protection contract (dhimma) can be concluded and as such they can be treated as 
slaves. According to the sharia, the owner can have sex with his slaves, regardless 
of whether he is married or not. 
Although it seems slightly ironic initially, working for the Al-Khansaa 
brigade is for some women a way of regaining some freedom of movement.246 
Being allowed to work for this women’s brigade is an exception to the principal 
ban for women to stay at home. Another exception is being allowed to work as a 
teacher or doctor, as both healthcare and education are separated according to 
gender (see paragraph 9.4).247 A woman can also study theology away from her 
home. The final exception is that a woman can independently leave home if she is 
expected to take part in the armed jihad through a fatwa.248 Because of these 
exceptions, more active women can also be regulated. 
The roles of men and women start at a very early stage. Being a child 
seems to last for a short period only. Girls wear veils from a young age and, as said 
before, they can get married as early as 9. After their time in primary school and 
following training, boys can be deployed for the jihad. According to some sources, 
this is compulsory from the age of 14, although there are indications that boys as 
young as 12 are being deployed for combat.249 This training is organised in special 
training camps for children, where they are taught the sharia and receive weapon 
training.250 
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7.2 Family life of Syria travellers 
Looking at the marital status of Syria travellers, all possible patterns emerge. 
Single persons arriving in Syria are expected to find a partner soon.251 Single 
women in particular have to get married as soon as possible after arriving in Syria 
in order to prevent their honour from being tainted.252 Unmarried women are 
housed in a convent until a suitable man is found whom they can marry.253 During 
this period, they are not allowed to venture outside.254 Single women often already 
had contact with their future husbands via social media.255 Once married, couples 
move in together and they are expected to have children soon.256 The family lives 
of European Syria travellers are then in line with the above approach to the roles of 
men and women. Back in 2013 – in the area of Aleppo – Dutch women were able 
to sunbathe on a roof terrace and go to the market with other women.257 This seems 
to be a thing of the past, not least because many Dutch women are known to have 
settled in Raqqa over the course of time, where ISIS’ influence is largest.258 
Messages from a couple of Dutch and Belgian girls/women to their families back 
home show that adapting to the role of woman is often hard for them. Nevertheless, 
they show the will to stay259 – although there have been indications in 2015 that 
more and more women wish to return.260 In other cases they are highly positive in 
their contacts with the home front. It is difficult to determine to what extent this is 
true.261 
When the man leaves home to work in the morning, the woman stays at 
home.262 Depending on how the man is then deployed, he could be back the same 
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evening, or he may not return for a couple of days.263 In the absence of the men, 
women regularly look for each other's company.264 Dutch and Belgian women in 
Raqqa therefore form a very tight-knit group.265 However, they hardly ever go 
outside.266 The man often supplies them with food and drink, instead of the woman 
buying this during the day.267 Nevertheless, foreign ISIS women seem to enjoy 
more freedoms and benefits than women who form part of the local population – 
who are suppressed by ISIS.268 Examples are more access to the Internet and, when 
they do go outside, getting priority in the queue for bread and free care at the 
hospital.269 In the family however, the woman is subordinate to the man. If and 
how often women can call their parents in the west seems to depend on his 
willingness. The means of communication are kept by the men and they monitor 
the conversations held by the women. Women are also checked when the men are 
away from home. In that case, another man is charged with keeping an eye on the 
woman, to the extent possible.270 
  In complete contrast with the local population (see the next paragraph 
about the avoidance mentality), ISIS families tend to recreate away from home. 
They relax alongside rivers271 or in the forest, for instance.272 The Raqqa area in 
particular seems to be in use as some kind of retreat.273 Possibilities for recreation 
are strongly propagated by IS, although the extent to which this is reality remains 
unclear. The family largely depends on the man in order to be able to get outdoors. 
When the man dies, the possibilities for both his wife and children are very much 
limited. When the man dies, a woman tends to remarry fairly quickly, and become 
someone’s second or third wife – on the one hand to create some freedom of 
movement for herself and her children and on the other because she does not want 
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to end up in a convent.274 Due to the limited amount of information available, the 
picture of Dutch and Belgian children is restricted to following classes at primary 
school and recreating outdoors under the supervision of the father and, if 
applicable, the mother. It is also striking that many Syria travellers have cats as 
pets.275  
 There are individual situations that leave the impression that men have a 
safer position in such family situations than men who left on their own.276 Looking 
at the overall picture however, the family situation seems to have few 
consequences for the deployment of Dutch men; “it's not as if men with family 
obligations are relieved from combat activities”277 This seems to be a general 
fact.278 The fact that everyone is expected to start a family and have children 
quickly supports this notion. In 2014, men know what can be expected from them 
(see the final section of paragraph 6.2). Also, the roles of fighter and husband seem 
to go well together, as evidenced by the many photos of fighters and their families, 
in which weapons often play a prominent role. 
 
7.3 Social isolation of the local population 
Other than with ISIS families, the local population is hardly able to recreate 
outdoors. Other outdoor activities are also restricted to a minimum as a result of the 
rules imposed and the strict enforcement thereof. Acts that violate ISIS’ 
interpretation of the sharia are severely punished in the caliphate. It is often left to 
the accused to prove his or her innocence.279 Executions and other punishments 
take place in public on an almost daily basis. Sometimes in thoroughfares and 
parks, often on central squares.280 Local residents are often forced to watch the 
event.281 A refugee says: “Seeing the beheading was the worst and we were forced 
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to watch. I had to watch them so often, sometimes every day again.”282 So as to 
realise collective prevention, the result is put on display: heads are impaled and 
bodies are left visible for a couple of days, along with a note about the offence 
committed. These severe punishments, the arbitrary nature and simplicity with 
which they can be imposed, have resulted in a culture of fear among the local 
population in ISIS territory, with people being afraid to voice any criticism and 
trying to avoid all possible confrontations to the greatest possible extent.283 A sense 
of powerlessness – the inability to intervene when witnessing injustice – and the 
fear of being inducted also play a role. The daily lives of the local residents in ISIS 
territory largely moved indoors during the course of 2014.284 A refugee says: 
“During the past month and a half I've hardly been outside. Only for the 
compulsory Friday prayer and the executions they take us to afterwards.”285 As a 
result, the streets appear ‘empty’286 – something the large number of refugees who 
left have also contributed to.287 The people you see in the streets are mainly armed 
men who are employed by ISIS. They include traffic controllers, checkpoint guards 
and employees of the decency police. Many residents venture outside only when it 
is necessary, such as a visit to the doctor or to buy clothing or food. The rest, even 
when it would not pose a logical problem in public, is done indoors out of 
precaution.288 Doors and windows are closed and windows are covered to prevent 
people from looking in and to reduce inspections by the decency services to the 
greatest possible extent.289 Parallel to the increasing influence of ISIS on daily life 
in 2014, the lives of local residents in the caliphate was increasingly characterised 
by social isolation and the streets by emptiness – which is still the case today.290 
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7.4 Integration of Syria travellers 
Arabic is the working language of ISIS, and as such it forms part of the permanent 
course material offered at training camp (see paragraph 6.1). After the period at 
training camp, the need to have a command of Arabic in order to be able to 
function seems to wane. By subsequently forming battalions with a shared 
language, it is possible to keep communicating in your own language. The Dutch 
often spend time with other Dutch people and with, for instance, Flemish people.291 
In addition, groups that leave for Syria together often end up in the same battalion. 
This makes integration within the unit relatively easy in principle. These units 
always have a number of people who understand and speak Arabic, and who can 
therefore communicate with leaders or other units.292  
Integration outside the katiba appears to be more problematic, especially in 
respect of local ISIS units. Foreign mujahedin often enjoy a particular identity and 
status. This goes hand in hand with practical advantages. This has resulted in 
indications of small-scale internal armed conflicts between local and foreign 
fighters about issues such as differences in salary, living conditions and the 
perception that local fighters are disproportionally often forced to fight in the 
bloodiest of field battles.293 In order to remove this dispute, there are plans to draw 
a uniform line in treatment, regardless of origin. It seems that this has yet to be 
fully realized. However, the principle of homogeneous foreign battalions nowadays 
appears to be less advertised by ISIS294, and, as mentioned in paragraph 6.2, some 
homogeneous battalions have already been disbanded. On the other hand, language 
problems and cultural differences also form obstacles for integration.295 This 
particularly seems to form an obstacle when trying to integrate in the higher 
hierarchy of ISIS, as these circles are dominated by Arabs.296 According to Agence 
France-Presse, the highest positions in Raqqa are fulfilled by Iraqi, Saudi and, to a 
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lesser extent, Tunisian people. Egyptian, European, Chechen and Syrian fighters 
usually fulfil the lower positions.297 This is not an insurmountable problem 
however, as shown by the fact that some Dutch Syria travellers fulfil relatively 
high positions.298 
The clustering according to language as is done with battalions can also be 
seen in how urban districts are occupied. In cities such as Raqqa, they appear to be 
inhabited by a specific European group of the population that speaks the same 
language.299 This also applies to the Dutch and Belgians, who often live in close 
proximity of each other in what one of the respondents referred to as “a kind of 
Camp Holland.”300 As a result, most foreigners are in general segregated from the 
rest of the Syrian population.301 Consequently, the situation of integration in the 
local community is, on a local level, similar to that of integration in a battalion. 
However, when we look at it from a broader perspective and also take the 
mentality of the local population into account, we see a different picture. Some of 
the locals see foreign fighters as occupiers.302 The local population also displays 
distrust towards foreigners for fear of espionage.303 This makes it hard to integrate 
in the community. Since, as described in the previous paragraph, residents are 
afraid of voicing criticism and the daily lives of the local population have 
increasingly shifted to the outdoors during 2014, the practical consequences of this 
mentality seem limited.304 In the longer term, the increasing normalisation of 
foreign families in cities could result in a better integration of foreigners in the 
local population.305 At the same time, we can see contradicting trends. In Raqqa for 
instance, there are Russian schools and shops for Chechen.306 
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8. The economy of the caliphate 
This chapter focuses on getting by in areas that are under the control of ISIS. It 
starts with an approach to the possibilities and impossibilities with regard to 
employment in these regions. We will then pay attention to the income of the local 
population and the strongly fluctuating prices since the start of the conflict. 
Developments in these fields mean that residents are increasingly forced to join 
ISIS. In conclusion we will discuss the financial position of people who have 
decided to join ISIS. 
 
8.1 Employment 
The emergence of ISIS does not so much constitute a full revision of 
administration and personnel on many fronts, but rather the deployment of 
personnel from the public sector who are already employed – either under threat of 
seizing their homes when they refuse. This means that a lot of people who used to 
work for the Syrian or Iraqi authorities, became employed at the Diwan al-
Khidamat307 after the arrival of ISIS (see footnote 108). Shops have also opened 
and residents of ISIS territory are allowed to temporarily leave the caliphate to 
trade elsewhere, just like people from other areas are permitted to enter the 
caliphate for a business visit.308 Leaving the caliphate is subject to conditions, so as 
to discourage people from fleeing. Sanctions may be imposed when these 
conditions are violated. For instance, someone who exceeds the permitted period to 
temporarily leave the caliphate (for trading purposes, but also to withdraw money 
from a bank, for instance, see chapter 5 about state finances), runs a risk of losing 
all the possessions he left behind or endangering his family.309 Also, anyone can 
invest (by setting up your own business, for instance); in principle, you do not have 
to have joined ISIS to be able to do this. There are a number of exceptions. 
Investments in oil and gas fields are allowed only when a person has sworn 
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allegiance to the caliph. Anyone can be employed at refineries however, and this is 
a source of income for many people. One important note to make is that it appears 
foreigners can only get such jobs when they join ISIS. In other cases, this will not 
be tolerated and the person in question will endanger himself – in part because of 
the distrust and fear for espionage and sabotage at ISIS.310 This does in fact apply 
to all activities which foreigners may want to undertake in ISIS territory.311 
Private businesses appear to pay more tax to ISIS than they used to have to 
pay to the Syrian or Iraqi authorities.312 ISIS levies taxes in accordance with the 
sharia and collects 2.5% of the capital of businesses and rich people. Farmers have 
to surrender 5 to 15% of their harvest. ISIS also levies taxes on businesses and 
farmers in other ways (see paragraph 5.6). Farmers for instance have to surrender 
not only a percentage of their harvest as tax, some the harvest is purchased by ISIS 
who then sells it when prices rise, while the transport of goods is also subject to 
tax. According to farmers and traders, ISIS benefits from the same harvest several 
times over.313 As a result of such collections and missed profits, businesses are 
hampered in their growth and jobs are lost.314 In addition, air strikes on oil 
refineries by the coalition have caused the loss of a lot of local jobs and as such led 
to a loss of income.315 
 
8.2 Poverty among the local population and the appeal of ISIS 
In addition to those who have lost their income after losing their jobs, many people 
living in ISIS territory have lost their income despite holding on to their jobs. 
Syrian and Iraqi authorities for instance pay fewer pensions and salaries to public 
sector personnel living in ISIS territory.  
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At the same time, prices in Syria have continued to rise. The gradual price 
increases up to the first half of 2013 then turned into an explosive price rise.316 
Prices in rebel areas rose fastest and are five to six times higher than in the areas 
under control of the Syrian regime.317 In ISIS territory, prices tend to be highest.318 
This is partially the result of the risks involved in trading in ISIS territory. Fewer 
traders from outside are willing to enter the ISIS caliphate. Those who are, factor in 
the risks in the price of the products they offer.319 In addition, the continuously 
rising price of petrol and oil also causes the prices of other products to rise, as the 
production and transport thereof also become more expensive.320 In some regions, 
the price of petrol has gone up to 18 dollars per gallon. The prices of gas, flour, 
bread and other basic products have risen correspondingly fast.321 There are 
indications that ISIS has committed to lower the prices of such products. 
According to the organisation itself, ISIS offered lower prices for food in Aleppo 
(before ISIS left the city in January 2014) for families who shopped in certain 
stores. In March 2014, the organisation claimed that beef was offered at a reduced 
rate to poor people in Maskanah. Also, residents have indicated that ISIS lowered 
the price of bread and made it available in Raqqa in larger quantities.322 However, 
more recent reports appear to show the opposite; ISIS increases prices for the local 
population in order to pressurise them to join the organisation. The regime does 
seem to ensure that shopkeepers do not artificially push prices up: all products 
intended for sale must be displayed. They are not allowed to create shortages and 
offer held-back goods when prices go up.323 Although the economic pressure can 
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be felt throughout the caliphate – and everywhere in Syria – it seems certain front 
lines where battle is fought with the Syrian regime are hit hardest.324  
Due to developments as referred to in paragraphs 8.1 and 8.2, the number 
of jobs fell in 2014 and poverty increased.325 In 2014, an average of about 20% of 
the population in Syria no longer had an income of their own or other assets. 
Specifically in the areas controlled by ISIS, this percentage appears to be slightly 
higher.326 Those who do have a job, earn an average of between 100 and 200 
dollars a month.327 This money is supposed to maintain a family – which often has 
an average of five persons – and often other members of the family too.328 This 
increasing poverty is reflected in the rising number or residents who turn to soup 
kitchens.329 The long queues for the soup kitchens are a phenomena that has been 
characteristic for the scene in big cities such as Raqqa.330 This rising poverty is 
being exploited by ISIS. By offering perspective and benefits to those who actively 
support ISIS – and by disadvantaging others – the organisation tries to entice 
residents to join ISIS. Out of necessity, families send someone to join the group; 
the man or woman to work, a son to be trained or a daughter to marry a fighter. 
This offers families a way of getting an income, food and other resources such as 
electricity.331 
 
8.3 Income, compensations and expenses 
Those who join Islamic State – either the local population or Syria travellers – can 
count on certain allowances. Nevertheless, the basic principle appears to be that 
they have to support themselves.332 To that end they receive a monthly salary. 
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Furthermore, Syria travellers often take their own money when they set out for 
Syria. Although perspectives with regard to income and allowances are more 
favourable for them – certainly so for Syria travellers – than for the local 
population that not effectively supports ISIS, they certainly do not live a life of 
luxury.333 
 
Salary 
ISIS is said to pay out higher wages that other rebel groups (see paragraph 10.3). 
Among the ranks of ISIS, foreigners are said to receive a higher financial reward 
than local fighters. As a basis they appear to receive twice the salary334 – something 
that is currently the subject of discussion (see also paragraph 7.4 about integration). 
Also, not all battalions of ISIS are equally close related to the organisation, so the 
salary can differ, depending on the battalion.335 The amount of salary seems to 
depend on, among other things, the position to be fulfilled336 and the location 
where a person is deployed.337 Regarding the former, those who are mainly 
responsible for supporting duties, such as cooking and administrative duties, 
receive a lower salary compared to fighters.338 With regards to the latter, recent 
financial constraints have caused ISIS to reduce salaries in Raqqa by 50 percent.339 
Due to these independences, salaries can vary greatly. A local fighter 
allegedly earns between 200 and 300 dollars a month. This amount breaks down 
into a basic salary and some bonuses, geared to, for instance, the household 
situation (50 dollars when a man is married, 50 dollars for each female slave and 
35 dollars per child).340 The findings with regard to the salary for foreigners at ISIS 
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range from 75 to 1,500 dollars a month.341 This amount is said to rise to 5,000 
dollars a month for a job with the security service or emir of a battalion, for 
instance.342 Such high amounts seem highly unlikely, however. On average, a 
salary appears to range between 300 and 800 dollars a month. Based on 
information about French Syria travellers, the salary of a traveller can also be 
geared to the size of his family, it seems. They were paid 100 dollars per month for 
each family member, for instance.343 Women who work for the Al-Khansaa brigade 
receive a monthly salary of about 200 dollars.344 It is highly likely that women in 
general will not earn more than men. 
The salary of (Dutch) Syria travellers in many cases appear to be enough to 
support themselves in the caliphate.345 Still, people often appeal to the home front 
for financial help. In certain cases they do not seem to have enough financial 
means to support themselves.346 However, in many other cases this does not appear 
to be the case, and it seems they ask for money under false pretences in order to get 
more than they need.347  
 
Food, drinks, clothing and other products 
During the initial period (see paragraph 6.1), food and drinks are said to be taken 
care of for foreigners. It may also partially be provided when they are active in the 
field.348 In other situations, they are expected to support themselves. Some of the 
items are brought by Syria travellers, such as their own kit and – at the request of 
travellers already in Syria – warm blankets. Other items are bought after having 
arrived in Syria. It used to be relatively easy to get products from Turkey. As 
border posts have disappeared and you need permission to leave ISIS territory, this 
                                                 
341 Respondent 1, Respondent 4; Respondent 6; Respondent 18; Respondent 25; Groen, 2015; The Hassan, 2015; 
Belli et al., 2014; NOS, 2015; Khatib, 2015 
342 Groen, 2015 
343 Ministère de la Justice (République Française), 2015 
344 TRAC, n.d. 
345 Respondent 4; Respondent 18 
346 Respondent 17 
347 Respondent 22 
348 Respondent 25 
 
 
83 
 
 
has become increasingly difficult as time passes.349 There are shops where products 
can be bought350 and restaurants where you can go out for a meal in ISIS 
territory351 – although this has become more dangerous in the course of 2014 (see 
the introduction of part 2 about bombings). Restaurants in particular seem popular 
among ISIS fighters.352 A special kind of market is the ‘booty market’. Seized 
goods are partially appropriated by the state, partially allocated to the fighters 
involved in the capture (see below, under ‘other allowances’) and partially sold by 
ISIS at such markets. “You can buy anything there: doors for your house, fridges, 
washing machines, cars, cows, furniture, ...” says a shopkeeper working close to 
one such market.353 This booty will cost less for ISIS fighters than for the local 
population, as can be seen in the table below, showing a number of products and 
corresponding prices. 
 
Table 1: Approximate prices at ‘booty markets’354 
Product Price for local population Price for ISIS fighters 
Car $ 4,700 $2,350 
Motorbike $186 $93 
Table and chairs $34 $17 
LCD TV $143 $72 
Small power generator $257 $129 
Large power generator $714 $357 
 
Not all provisions are as readily available as the propaganda would like us to 
believe. Shops with Dutch products seem to be highly over-emphasised in such 
material compared to reality.355 Still, luxury products such as chocolate and crisps 
seem to be available. The range of products and the requirements they have to meet 
since the arrival of ISIS are highly regulated. Cosmetics have been banned from the 
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shelves and related shops were closed.356 Cigarettes, drugs and alcohol are banned 
too – although there are indications that the smoking ban is not enforced as strictly 
everywhere and that the embargo on the sale of cigarettes has been reversed in 
certain areas in order to increase satisfaction and popularity.357  
 
Housing 
Houses whose original owners have fled or killed are appropriated by ISIS.358 
Syrians who own a second home have to surrender one.359 These homes are made 
available to foreigners who join ISIS.360 They therefore live spread out across the 
cities361, although there is a regular pattern where people of the same nationality are 
placed in the same district (see paragraph 7.4 about integration). Men and women 
are housed separately, unless it concerns a family; men who leave for Syria with 
their families – or get married there – can count on a house of their own.  
Information about the extent to which Syria travellers have to pay rent is 
two-tiered. There are indications that accommodation is offered entirely free of 
charge362, but we have also heard of scenarios where Dutch people were threatened 
with eviction if they did not pay the rent in time.363 As the conflict progressed, the 
picture that Syria travellers owe rent seems to come to the foreground more.364  
 
Weapons 
Weapons are made available by ISIS.365 In most cases, male Syria travellers will 
receive an old Kalashnikov or similar weapon. They are free to get more weapons 
themselves. They do have to pay for these though.366 Hiring weapons also appears 
to be an option. During a private interview, one young Dutchman says he got a 
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weapon on loan on the market for a deposit of 700 Euros.367 As a standard, women 
are not armed, although ISIS does appear to give women the opportunity to get 
their own weapons.368 Apparently, they often carry a weapon in their bag.369 
Women working for the Al-Khansaa brigade seem to be armed in principle. 
 
Transport 
In exceptional cases, Syria travellers can get a car.370 In general however, they have 
to pay for their own transport.371 There are indications that it is possible to get a 
public transport allowance. One Dutch Syria traveller employed at a sharia court 
was able to make free use of public transport with a pass.372 To what extent this 
applies to other (Dutch) Syria travellers or for others in the ranks of ISIS, is not 
clear. 
 
Other allowances 
Participants in a training camp for teenagers, which also included foreign Syria 
travellers, are alleged to have received smartphones and money.373 To what extent 
this is standard practice is not known. Furthermore, during periods of actual 
deployment, fighters can, in addition to their salary, also count on part of the goods 
seized after fights or after the capture of a town or city.374 Individual soldiers have 
to hand in the goods to their commanders, who will distribute these goods among 
the fighters after the end of the hostilities, and after deduction of a fifth share for 
the state. Non-military goods are sold at the aforementioned ‘booty markets’. Non-
Muslim women who do not convert to Islam and who do not recognise the 
authority of the Islamic state by accepting the protection treaty, dhimma, (when it 
concerns Jews and Christians), can be turned into slaves and form part of the war 
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booty to be distributed. In addition to religious feelings, the prospect of the war 
booty may increase motivation for combat. 
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9. Infrastructure and facilities 
Chapter 9 is the final chapter about daily life in the caliphate of ISIS. ISIS provides 
a range of services.375 The elements in the fields of administration, legislation, the 
administration of justice and enforcement have already been discussed in chapter 5. 
This chapter will focus on the availability of electricity and water (paragraph 9.1), 
the availability of the Internet and telecommunications (paragraph 9.2), transport 
within ISIS territory (paragraph 9.3) and the functioning of healthcare and 
education (paragraph 9.4). 
 
9.1 Electricity and water 
For a long time now in the Syria of al-Assad, electricity and water are not 
continuously available throughout the day. This is not much different in areas that 
have come into the hands of ISIS in the course of the conflict – often in a less 
favourable proportion.376 Among other things, the availability of electricity affects 
street lighting, lighting at home, the functioning of fridges, TVs, radios and 
hospital equipment. The availability of both strongly varies within the regions. The 
availability of water and electricity in areas of combat is particularly low.377 It 
appears that ISIS uses existing facilities and structures to provide services. Still, 
there is often a significant difference between the periods before and after ISIS’ 
arrival.  
Data of energy consumption in Iraqi territory under the control of ISIS 
shows that this consumption fell drastically after the arrival of ISIS – particularly 
in the three provinces where ISIS’ influence is biggest.378 At the end of 2014 for 
instance, Mosul had no electricity for weeks, because the Iraqi government had 
taken the city off the electricity grid.379 The electricity supply in Syria is also 
restricted. In Raqqa for instance, periods of about two hours during which 
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electricity is available alternate with periods of about six hours without 
electricity.380 At the same time, there are indications that there is no electricity for 
twenty hours each day.381 Part of the inability to provide more electricity on a large 
scale lies in the fact that there is a lack of fuel.382 Resulting shortages in electricity 
then resulted in higher prices of oil products and gas in the Iraqi province of 
Nineveh, for instance.383 So as to prevent such price increases and in order to be 
able to provide lighting, ISIS set up a service that monitors the use of electricity, 
lays electricity cables and organises workshops on how to repair such cables if they 
are faulty.384 The lack of fuel is in part compensated by letting generators run on 
unrefined crude oil directly from the well.385 Nevertheless, electricity in the 
caliphate is available on a limited basis only. As a result, large cities such as Raqqa 
and Mosul are covered in black (flags, clothing, etc.) not only during the day , but 
also at night. 
As for electricity, as with many other subjects, we need to make a clear 
distinction between availability of electricity for ISIS and the availability of 
electricity for the local population. ISIS has its own generators which it uses to 
generate extra electricity and which ISIS alone benefits from. Still, in the latter 
case the electricity supply is not entirely stable either.386 This also means there are 
situations in which Dutch men and women have limited electricity, or have even 
spent consecutive periods without electricity.387 
The situation is similar in respect of the availability of water – also because 
the water treatment process requires electricity. As such, hygienic water is often 
available in limited amounts. Since water has been available alternately in Syria for 
a long time now, a lot of homes are fitted with water storage tanks. This enables 
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people to temporarily bridge periods during which no water is available.388 The 
lack of water is also in part compensated by active aid organisations. The Red 
Cross for instance supplies drinking water to ISIS territory, albeit not everywhere. 
According to director Yves Daccord, the Red Cross is able to provide about 85% of 
the Syrian population with safe drinking water. The residents of Raqqa are among 
the 15% that are not reached.389 
 
9.2 The Internet and telecommunications 
Access to the Internet appears to vary strongly. The connection is often week and 
slow.390 When a signal gets stronger, everyone immediately makes use of it.391 The 
use and availability of the Internet are, as with many other cases, increasingly 
regulated as the conflict progresses. Examples include orders for Internet cafés to 
ensure that wireless Internet connections are available only at those cafés, the order 
to disable Internet connections at times of prayer, and general bans on the use of 
the Internet until further notice.392 In 2013, most Dutch Syria travellers seemed to 
have an Internet connection at home. However in the course of time, if people 
wanted to make use of the Internet – whether or not provided by Turkish providers 
such as in the northern territories of ISIS393 – they had to increasingly turn to 
Internet cafés.394 In general, you can “make ordinary phone calls” in the 
caliphate395, although in this case too, signal strength may vary. This often seems to 
be the case with Turkish SIM cards in the border areas with Turkey. This also 
applies to Dutch Syria travellers.396 They often have their own phones and other 
equipment, such as laptops or tablets.397 Certain peripheral equipment, such as GPS 
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and Apple systems have been banned since December 2014.398 A lot of Syria 
travellers are on social media such as Twitter, Telegram, Whatsapp and Facebook, 
which they use to make contact with their families or to post about their lives in 
Syria or about issues back in the Netherlands.  
 
9.3 Transport 
ISIS appears to make an effort to maintain roads. Examples include the repair of 
holes and bumps in the road network and sprucing up central reservations in order 
to make roads more attractive from an aesthetic point of view.399 This facilitates the 
transport of goods and persons within the caliphate.400 This way, ISIS provides a 
logistical service. Public transport makes it possible to travel within the borders of 
the area controlled by ISIS.401 
 
9.4 Healthcare and education 
One of the consequences of the aforementioned brain drain and loss of specialist 
knowledge is a shortage of teachers and medical personnel. At the same time, 
medical facilities are scarce.402 Other than providing water to parts of the 
population, the Red Cross is not able to reach ISIS territory for the supply of 
medicine.403 In practice, this has translated in several examples of people from ISIS 
territory – either ordinary civilians or those who effectively joined ISIS – leaving 
the caliphate to receive medical care. Examples include residents who (illegal or 
otherwise) leave ISIS territory to visit an eye surgeon in Kurdish territory, 
wounded fighters who are taken to Turkey for treatment and women who 
temporarily return to Western Europe to give birth.404 Although they can get 
medical care in ISIS territory, such examples imply that the quality and quantity of 
such care within the caliphate leave much to be desired. This includes Raqqa 
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hospital among others. It is shown in propaganda material about healthcare in the 
caliphate, but in reality it is operational to a minimum extent only, according to an 
aid worker with family members in the city.405 Many other hospitals have closed 
down. As those who effectively joined ISIS often seem to be given priority over 
ordinary citizens, the latter are hit extra hard by shortages.406 This can also be 
illustrated with indications that ISIS, in Mosul for instance, seizes medication to 
treat its own members.407 In addition to trying to attract medics from abroad, 
among other things, ISIS tries to professionalise healthcare by offering its own 
doctor training408 – to both men and women. The latter is required, as men and 
women are kept separate in healthcare.409 Apparently, “without female doctors, 
there would be no healthcare for women, and sick women would be unable to give 
birth or look after their families.”410 A position as doctor is therefore among the 
few job opportunities for women in the caliphate (see paragraph 7.1). 
To overcome the lack of professionals and people with specific skill in 
ISIS territory, ISIS does not only appeal to foreign411 (and domestic412) expertise, 
but also offers education and training. The number of schools in the caliphate 
where classes are given has fallen dramatically during the past period though. 
Education in ISIS territory is structured on the basis of an ideological framework. 
In addition to rules such as girls having to wear a head scarf (hijab) from the age of 
five when they go to primary school (from about age 10 or 11) and that education 
has to be separated according to gender (which means education is one of the few 
places where women can find work: the education of female students requires 
female teachers413), ISIS puts its stamp on the content of education too. The content 
of study programmes is banned, for instance, when it is seen as being in violation 
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of the sharia. Examples include music, sports, philosophy and classes about 
subjects such as democracy. Education at ISIS primary schools mainly consists of 
Koran classes, Sunna classes and history classes about the caliphate of the 
Rashidun (7th century).414 In addition, there are indications that maths classes are 
also given (which seemingly entails calculations with bombs415) as well as English 
classes.416 At the same time, terms such as ‘homeland’ and ‘Syria’ have been 
replaced with terms such as ‘the land of the Muslims’ and ‘Islamic State’.417 
According to Peter Neumann (ICSR), the aim of this educational system of ISIS is 
to indoctrinate children.418 There is no such thing as a ‘normal school’ anymore.419 
For the sake of regulating this system, home schooling – which seemed possible in 
the early stages420 – is now banned.421 Children are obliged to follow education at 
the Koran schools of ISIS.422 Follow-up education has also been adjusted to the 
ideological framework. More specifically, this means that entire faculties have 
disappeared from universities – and with that the corresponding study 
programmes.423 An overview of the revised faculties in Iraq is given in table 2. 
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Table 2: Colleges and institutes in ISIS, Iraq424 
No. College/institute 
1 Mosul Medical College (Medical Sciences University) 
2 Ninawa Medical College (Medical Sciences University) 
3 Dentistry College (Medical Sciences University) 
4 Pharmacy College (Medical Sciences University) 
5 Nursing College (Medical Sciences University) 
6 Medical Technician Institute (Medical Sciences University) 
7 Engineering College (Mosul University) 
8 Sciences College (Mosul University) 
9 Accounting and Mathematical College (Mosul University) 
10 Veterinary College (Mosul University) 
11 Agriculture and Forestry College (Mosul University) 
12 Education College (Mosul University) 
13 Economics and Management College (Mosul University) 
14 Technical College (Mosul University) 
15 Technical Institute (Mosul University) 
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10. Al-Nusra and affiliated organisations 
About daily life in the areas that are under the control of Jabhat al-Nusra 
considerably less is known than life under ISIS. These regions therefore form a 
“grey area”. On the one hand, this is caused by the overwhelming attention for 
ISIS, which means attention for other organisations fades into the background. On 
the other, the al-Nusra front is more closed than ISIS, as a result of which it is more 
difficult to obtain information. Also, JaN regularly monitors the areas with the help 
of other organisations. The policy of JaN and daily life in the areas under the 
control of al-Nusra are therefore not always easy to map out. 
This chapter discusses daily life in the areas under the control of Jabhat al-
Nusra and affiliated organisations on the basis of the limited information that is 
available. This reflection will stick to the main structure as used in the explanation 
of daily life in ISIS territory. 
 
10.1 From border crossing to deployment 
Like ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra operates safe houses and training camps.425 Joining the 
ranks of Jabhat al-Nusra is not as simple as joining ISIS. Al-Nusra controls who 
can join to a greater extent.426 A growing suspicion of infiltration has led to a lot of 
value being attached to personal references and tazkiyya, which can be checked at 
the border.427 A new recruit has to be nominated by one or more fighters or 
commanders before being able to join al-Nusra.428 Furthermore, JaN has a larger 
number of local fighters among its ranks. 
As al-Nusra and affiliated organisations in the regions under their control 
are dealing with the administration of these areas to a lesser extent than ISIS, 
joining such organisations seems in principle to result in the role as a fighter.429 
According to the Quilliam Foundation, the first step to join the ranks of Jabhat al-
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Nusra is to fight on the front line. This is how the courage, dedication and loyalty 
of potential recruits are tested.430 
 Still, in the case of Jabhat al-Nusra at least, there appear to be possibilities 
for other activities – albeit to a lesser extent compared to ISIS. A fighter in the 
region said that “JaN assumes its responsibilities towards the local population.” For 
instance, in a message in June 2015, al-Nusra announced it was looking for experts 
in the fields of electricity, water, mechanics, the environment, accountancy and 
media.431 As there is a need for professionals in addition to fighters, al-Nusra 
documents the capacities of new recruits.432 As with ISIS, these new recruits have 
to take an oath.433 The small number of women working at Jabhat al-Nusra appears 
to be responsible mainly for gathering information.434 
 
10.2 Daily life from a social perspective 
Other than ISIS, which imposes strict sentences for behaviour that violates the 
sharia, Jabhat al-Nusra tends to refrain from this (although we have heard stories 
about amputations and executions in the areas under the control of al-Nusra).435 In 
the areas under the control of al-Nusra and allied groups, the rules tend to be less 
strict, no hudud sentences are in principle imposed (punishment for behaviour in 
violation of the sharia) and people tend to have more freedoms than with ISIS. The 
situation of social isolation from the local population in ISIS territory, which 
expresses itself as empty streets (see paragraph 7.3), appears to occur a lot less 
often in these areas.436 This particularly applies for areas outside the front line, 
where daily life can to some extent be regarded as normal.437 
Looking at the freedoms of women, the parallels with ISIS seem more 
transparent. Women with al-Nusra are said to be forced to wear a hijab and abaya, 
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wearing make-up is banned and there are stories that women mostly have to stay 
indoors.438In 2013, the Islamic council in Aleppo issued the following fatwa: 
 
“Muslim women are not permitted to leave their homes without 
wearing a discrete dress, they are not permitted to wear tight 
clothing or to wear make-up on their faces. It is the duty of all our 
sisters to obey God and to observe the Islamic etiquette.”439 
 
Still, women in rebel territory seem to have more freedoms than women at ISIS. A 
woman who had joined Jabhat al-Nusra said: 
 
“I've worked for three years and I can work again now if I want to. 
(...) We're not the same as the Qaeda of Pakistan or other places. 
Our society here is different. Look at Saudi Arabia, that’s not Al 
Qaeda, but their women have fewer rights than we have here. They 
can’t come and go as they please or drive a car. I can.”440 
 
As with ISIS, al-Nusra also has the phenomenon of units with fighters of the same 
nationality or fighters that speak the same language.441With regard to integration, 
the situation seems to resemble that of Syria travellers at ISIS (see paragraph 7.4). 
A Belgian al-Nusra fighter told Belgian researcher Montasser AlDe’emeh the 
following during his visit to Syria: “We’ve got close ties with Dutch fighters. (...) 
It’s becoming like some sort of mini Europe here. We look each other up and 
communicate in Dutch.”442  
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10.3 Getting by at rebel groups 
Throughout Syria, residents are faced with rising prices and increasing poverty. 
This is no different for the people living in the regions controlled by Jabhat al-
Nusra or other affiliated organisations. Among other things, al-Nusra supplies 
water and food to the people living in the areas it has conquered.443 The 
organisation also pays wages to the fighters.444 The extent of these wages varies 
between 100 and 300 dollars per month.445 In general, this is less than what Syria 
travellers earn at ISIS (see paragraph 8.3), but more than what the FSA pays 
fighters, for instance – which seems to vary between 35 and 95 dollars per 
month.446A similar amount in salary is paid to fighters of the local Syrian ‘Northern 
Storm’ brigade (Liwa `Asifat al-Shamal)447 – which forms part of the Islamic Front. 
It is likely that fighters of Jabhat al-Nusra and affiliated organisations, like ISIS 
fighters, can also count on part of the battlefield booty. In areas such as Idlib and 
Azaz, where daily life is said to be relatively normal under the control of al-
Nusra448 (as a result of which these areas attract relatively many displaced people), 
there appear to be more options to work and sell products compared to many other 
areas under rebel control – which often have a less favourable climate for activities 
compared to the aforementioned regions or even big cities in ISIS territory, such as 
Raqqa and Mosul.449  
 
10.4 Infrastructure and facilities 
In its controlled areas, al-Nusra Front provides for the administration of justice, 
education and basic facilities such as electricity and water, among other things.450 
Education for children is, just as in ISIS territory, aimed at preparing young 
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children for the jihad.451 More specific information about infrastructure and 
facilities is scarce. We can paint a general picture of the rebel area. During the 
conflict, the electricity grid has increasingly become the target of attacks. As a 
result, the electricity grid in Syria is largely inactive. This particularly applies to 
rebel areas. In quite a lot of areas under rebel control, there is little to no electricity 
due to bombings, the inability of the rebels to maintain the grid and due to the 
Syrian government shutting off the rebel area from the electricity grid. As a result, 
families have to depend on diesel generators, causing demand for oil to rise and 
prices of food and other products to rise as well.452 Shortages in electricity have 
also affected the functioning of water distribution and treatment plants. There also 
seems to be a shortage in medical supplies in all rebel areas.453 Some form of 
public transport seems to be in place in rebel areas – set up either by the controlling 
party or at the initiative of locals. Such services transport people within the 
boundaries of the territory of the controlling organisation.454 
When making a comparison with ISIS, it emerges that Jabhat al-Nusra 
provides similar services to ISIS and the above and previous paragraphs imply that 
people living in areas of al-Nusra and affiliated rebel groups are faced with similar 
problems as people living in ISIS territory. Similarities with life in ISIS territory 
can also be seen in the ability of courts to issue local decrees, as already discussed 
in paragraph 5.7.  
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11. Conclusion 
This study paints a general picture of the life of the average Syria traveller in 
certain parts of Syria. The exploratory nature of this study at the same time means 
that it is impossible to claim general validity. We can therefore not rule out 
exceptions to what is discussed in this study. It would require more time, more 
interviews and, ideally, local fieldwork. Nevertheless, the authors share the opinion 
that this report is the first publication to offer a thorough picture of various aspects 
of life of Dutch men and women in Syria. In this final chapter, the research 
questions will be answered on the basis of the insights described in this report. 
First, we will discuss a number of general issues about the conflict. We will then 
focus on the main practical aspects of daily life in Syria. In conclusion, we will talk 
about the probability of a number of assumptions about the situation of Dutch Syria 
travellers.  
 
11.1 Insights into the conflict  
Since 2012, a considerable amount of people from the west, including an estimated 
260 Dutch men and women, travelled to the conflict area in Syria (and Iraq) – a 
figure that continues to rise. These people often join salafi jihadist groups or 
affiliated organisations (such as rebel groups under the Islamic Front). Such groups 
fight not only against the regime of al-Assad, but also for the formation of an 
Islamic state (in the long term or otherwise). Non-salafi jihadist groups such as the 
Free Syrian Army on the other hand, do not have any Dutch men or women among 
their ranks, as far as we know.  
One look at existing literature tells us that the motives to join a movement 
such as ISIS or JaN vary wildly. For some, the wish to escape the Netherlands (for 
whatever reason) is an important reason to leave. Others are looking for adventure 
and excitement or feel attracted by a context of violence. The need to fight all kinds 
of injustice also is an important motivation to travel to Syria. Many feel they could 
be a mujahid and think they can fulfil their duty to take part in the combat (jihad) 
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that way. The social network also often plays a central role when travelling to 
Syria, as well as the organisation where they ultimately end up with. People may 
hear stories through friends or acquaintances about a certain organisation, sparking 
their interest. Also, organisations have become increasingly more careful about 
allowing foreigners to join their ranks. During our study, ISIS and JaN have been 
described as “the world’s most infiltrated organisations”. Having someone you 
know at these organisations is said to make it easier for people to join. At Jabhat al-
Nusra, personal references and recommendations now even appear to be necessary 
in order to be able to join. 
A more recent motive seems to be the desire to obey the religious appeal 
from al-Baghdadi to Muslims around the world to come to the caliphate and to 
contribute to the establishment and protection thereof (hijra). In his appeal, he 
indicated that the caliphate had a specific need for judges, doctors, engineers and 
people with administrative or military experience. Since the caliphate was 
established in 2014, the majority of Syria travellers settled down in the areas that 
are under the control of ISIS. Dutch Syria travellers are no exception. Some of the 
Syria travellers who at that time had joined JaN or one of its affiliated 
organisations defected to ISIS during this period.  
In most cases it appears to concern a combination of various social, 
practical and ideological motives to go to Syria. The media reports by 
organisations such as ISIS, JaN and Islamic Front also pay attention to various 
practical, social and ideological matters. They themselves highlight various aspects 
of daily life in Syria – including the role of violence on and behind the front line. 
  
11.2 Daily life in Syria 
Some of the questions asked which were the focus of this study, are about the daily 
lives of people in the area of conflict. What is daily life like for these people? How 
do they support themselves on a day-to-day basis? What is life like in Syria for the 
average fighter? What do they get up to? The answers to those questions will be 
discussed below.  
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The daily administration, the financial situation and the prevailing rules 
have changed considerably in many Syrian areas as the civil war progressed. As it 
emerged, Syria travellers from Western Europe mainly join ISIS and, to a slightly 
lesser extent, Jabhat al-Nusra. The organisational structures of these organisations 
are of interest with regard to our questions, as the daily experiences of people are 
strongly related to them and can be understood better against that background. 
During this study, we paid attention to the main bodies of ISIS and the head of the 
state, appointed in June 2014 and announced Caliph by the Consultative Council. 
We also focused on other aspects of the administration, the law (the sharia and its 
application) and the enforcement of public order and safety. In all cases, we see 
that over the years, the areas under the control of ISIS have undergone major 
changes that also determine the position of foreigners (more about this later). In 
addition, in order to better understand the position of most Dutch Syria travellers, 
we have looked at the organisation and composition of ISIS’ army. There are now 
enough primary and secondary written sources as well as interviewees that have 
enabled us to paint a fairly clear picture of the organisational structure of ISIS. 
This is not so much the case for the administration in areas under the 
control of JaN and its affiliated parties. Given ISIS’ rapid advance and the notion 
that most Syria travellers from Western Europe joined this group, for many, ISIS 
holds a spotlight position. Furthermore, JaN, primarily a military organisation, was 
in 2014 only to a limited extent willing to open up about, for instance, its 
organisational structure. Given the above, we found fewer interviewees that could 
answer questions specifically about JaN and affiliated parties. Another factor that 
complicates matters is that JaN shared power with other groups in most areas. 
Although JaN, unlike ISIS, does not want to establish an Islamic state right away, it 
does try to offer the government provisions that are required due to the 
disappearance of the central state. Reliable sources show that in JaN areas too, law 
and order are enforced through application of the sharia. Among other things, 
various sharia courts have been set up. In addition to application of criminal law, 
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these courts also issue local decrees, which are similar to the prevailing rules in 
areas that are controlled by ISIS (such as those about separating boys and girls at 
schools and the closure of shops). JaN also distributes food and bread where 
necessary and it supplies drinking water and electricity in various areas.  
 An important distinction must be made between the life of the local 
population and the lives of people who fulfil a job within these movements. 
Although JaN in particular maintains reasonable ties with parts of the local 
population, these civilians tend to live marginal lives.  
Due to the persistent civil war, poverty in Syria was again on the increase 
in 2014. Many people lost their jobs or income and they were faced with price 
increases. The income of a Syrian family in ISIS territory – an average of 100 to 
200 dollars (which is supposed to support at least five persons) – is not enough and 
many people are therefore forced to go to soup kitchens to get food. ISIS provides 
those it employs with wages, food (at a reduced rate or otherwise), medication and 
things such as electricity. This prompts families to let one or more family members 
join the ranks of ISIS. However, joining ISIS is something a lot of residents want 
to avoid. The violent and arbitrary way in which ISIS imposes punishment has 
caused fear for this organisation among many people. They try to avoid any 
confrontations with ISIS, as a result of which the lives of the local population have 
for a large part shifted to indoors. They venture outside only for necessary 
activities, such as buying or collecting food. Outdoor recreation seems to be a thing 
of the past now. Due to this social isolation, the streets of cities under strong 
control of ISIS, such as Raqqa, are relatively empty.  
 In areas where fighting still goes on (such as in cities on the front line), the 
economic pressure seems to be even more tangible. Traders often stay away and 
due to sieges and the resulting shortages, prices can rise even further. Electricity 
and water are usually also available to a lesser extent in these areas. However, the 
difference between areas on the front line and those behind it is generally a lot 
more vague since the coalition started its bombings. 
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The lives of foreigners 
This study explicitly focuses on the situation of Dutch people in Syria. Europeans 
travel to Syria via different routes. In 2014, the majority ended up at ISIS or JaN 
(or an organisation directly affiliated to them). Upon arrival, men and women are 
separated, they are registered and the men are interviewed about their backgrounds 
and motives for coming to Syria. The men are then taken to training camps, where 
they receive military and theological training. Syria travellers also take an oath of 
loyalty or obedience (bay’a). With such an oath, a Syria traveller declares that he 
will carry out all tasks assigned to him. After having completed this training, 
foreigners can end up in various positions. Most of them will be deployed as 
fighters, but there are examples of people fulfilling other roles. This may be a job 
as a doctor, an engineer, a hacker or with one of the media channels of the 
organisations. ISIS and JaN urgently need people with such specific expertise, due 
to the brain drain that has hit many areas because of the continuing violence. The 
position someone will ultimately fulfil partially depends on his or her individual 
preferences, but also on his or her abilities (for instance, certain training or 
practical experience gained in the country of origin). Furthermore, a command of 
Arabic (the official language of ISIS) also seems to be an important condition for 
many jobs – such as the police or administration – within this framework. Those 
with a role other than fighter remain reservists for that matter – by virtue of the 
oath they took earlier – and can still be called to fulfil certain military or police 
positions. At ISIS, all men are in principle armed.  
Foreigners receive a salary for the work they carry out. At ISIS, a Syria 
traveller is paid an average 300 to 800 dollar per month. At Jabhat al-Nusra the 
salary appears to be a bit lower in general. The salary depends on a number of 
factors, such as the position, location of deployment and the size of the fighter’s 
family. In principle, Syria travellers are responsible for supporting themselves. The 
salary they are paid appears to be sufficient for this, also because of economic and 
medical privileges.  
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 The Dutch are often put in houses whose original owners have fled, were 
evicted or have died. It is striking that the Dutch and Flemish often live near each 
other and form close-knit groups. The main explanation for this is the language 
they have in common. This makes it relatively easy for Dutch Syria travellers to 
integrate in their immediate housing environment. Since ISIS and Syria travellers 
are regarded as occupiers by some of the local people, communication and 
integration outside this immediate housing environment is more difficult. Foreign 
women in these regions generally look after the family. They care for their 
husbands and are responsible for bringing up the children. In some cases they also 
fulfil roles – through social media – in encouraging other women in their countries 
of origin to come to Syria too. A select number of foreign women also fulfil a 
number of other jobs. Some women are teachers, nurses, chefs or have joined the 
Al-Khansaa brigade, which ensures women dress and behave demurely.  
 The salary can be used to buy groceries and even luxurious items such as 
chocolate or crisps. Many foreigners have also brought their own money or they 
receive money from family, friends and acquaintances back in the Netherlands 
(with whom they are in regular contact via the Internet or telephone). ISIS fighters 
are furthermore entitled to some of the war booty. This is also the case at Jabhat al-
Nusra. 
The life of a fighter 
According to our sources, the majority of foreign men travel to Syria to become 
fighters and contribute to the armed jihad. As indicated, life as a mujahid (fighter 
who takes part in the jihad) is an attractive prospect for many and therefore a big 
reason to travel to Syria. Foreign fighters with organisations such as ISIS, JaN or 
affiliated organisations have various duties. We can paint a general picture about 
this. After their interview and training, ISIS provided all foreigners with weapons – 
in many cases they were old Kalashnikovs or similar weapons. Fighters are free to 
get more weapons themselves, at their own expense. Fighters are placed in 
battalions (katiba). These battalions are composed on the basis of cultural 
similarities and language. That is why Dutch and Flemish fighters are often in the 
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same battalion, enabling them to speak Dutch with each other. Foreign fighters can 
be deployed in various ways. They may be instructed to guard border areas or 
checkpoints (ribaat) or to join the battle on the front lines after some time. Others 
guard prisons or are, directly or indirectly, involved in torture or executions. To 
what extent foreign fighters are involved in such activities is hard to assess. It 
depends on the location and time and also on the commands issued by the superior 
(emir). 
It has been established that fighters alternate periods at the front with times 
behind the front lines. A period at the front can last as little as one day or as much 
as a number of weeks. Once back from the battlefield, they enjoy their time with 
their families, but they often also carry out other duties (such as administrative 
work, da`wa or patrolling the cities). 
Foreign fighters enjoy a special position, at least, in the ranks of ISIS. An 
ISIS fighter has privileges compared to local civilians. In addition, a foreign ISIS 
fighter also has privileges compared to a local ISIS fighter. They include a higher 
salary and the allocation of accommodation. This has resulted in indications of 
trouble and internal conflicts. ISIS has indicated that it may start treating all 
fighters equally in future. Such a uniform line has not been realised yet. 
 We have seen that most Dutch men who have left for Syria come to fulfil a 
role as fighter in the conflict. Yet, there are other roles in which individuals are 
(initially) not directly involved in the armed conflict on the front lines, but 
contribute to the organisation in a more indirect way. The type and extent of 
violence involved then depends on the specific role in question and the erratic 
course of the civil war in Syria.455 
                                                 
455 In this publication, the paragraph about the formal research assignment is not included. 
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Appendix A: List of interviews 
 
Table 3: List of respondents 
No. Explanation 
1 Researcher 
2 Journalist 
3 Propaganda researcher 
4 Researcher 
5 Researcher 
6 Researcher 
7 Aid organisation focused on Syria 
8 Co-founder local activist group in Syria 
9 Activist/former teacher in Syria 
10 School manager in Syria 
11 Inhabitant ISIS territory 
12 Inhabitant ISIS territory 
13 ISIS fighter 
14 ISIS fighter 
15 Employee Syrian human rights organisation 
16 Employee international aid organisation 
17 Former employee organisation for social support 
18 Employee Ministry of Security and Justice 
19 Head of press agency focusing on Syria, with local journalists 
20 Syrian refugee 
21 Head organisation for social support 
22 Researcher 
23 Dutch Syrian, visited Syria recently 
24 Family member of Dutch Syria travellers 
25 Researcher 
26 Journalist 
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Appendix B: List of topics 
1. Introduction 
▪ An explanation about the study and why this interview is held; 
▪ An explanation about how the information from the interview will be used (particularly anonymity/source 
reference); 
▪ An explanation about the process of the interview. 
2. Daily life in general 
Overarching questions Topics/sub-questions Clarifying questions 
What are the daily lives like 
of people living in the 
conflict area? 
 
What are the daily lives like 
of people living in areas, 
conquered by rebels, where 
fighting no longer takes 
place? 
 
How do they support 
themselves on a day-to-day 
basis? 
▪ Work (Yes/no? What kind of job? Enough 
income to support themselves on a day-to-day 
basis? If no job: where do they get an income 
from and how do they support themselves? …) 
▪ Shopping/shops (Baker? Butcher? Department 
stores? Fashion store? Accessible? Affordable? 
Enough food and clothing for 
themselves/family? …) 
▪ Housing (Where? What kind of housing? Gas? 
Water? Electricity? …) 
▪ Transport (Own transport? Public transport? 
Affordable? …) 
▪ Safety (Safe to go into the street? …) 
▪ Integration (Language barriers? Funny looks? 
Treated differently? …) 
▪ Medical assistance (Hospital? Family doctor? 
Availability medication? …) 
▪ Education (Primary/secondary/university? 
Childcare? …) 
▪ Recreation (Things to do? What is allowed and 
what not? …) 
▪ ICT infrastructure (Internet? Telephone? 
Computer? Radio? Reliability? …) 
▪ Family (Differences when someone arrives on 
his own or with his entire family? ...) 
▪ Is there a difference in availability of facilities 
for members of a combating group and 
‘ordinary’ residents? 
 
Development: 
▪ How did this develop in 2014/did any changes 
occur in that respect? 
 
Region: 
▪ Answer the questions above for A) life on the 
front line and B) life in conquered rebel area. 
Can you give an 
explanation? 
 
Could you give a couple of 
examples of that? 
 122 
 
 
3. Daily lives of Syria travellers 
Overarching questions Topics/sub-questions Clarifying questions 
What are the daily lives like 
of fighters of a rebel group 
and of members of a combat 
group which do not form 
part of the armed conflict 
themselves? 
 
How do they support 
themselves on a day-to-day 
basis? 
▪ Group (ISIS? JaN? FSA? Other group? 
Switched from one to the other? …) 
▪ Armament/training (Armed? With what? 
Trained? For what? …) 
▪ Duties (Duties in the group? Fighting? Border 
post? Cooking? …) 
▪ Reward (Money? Resources? How much? 
Enough to support yourself? …) 
▪ Shopping/shops (Baker? Butcher? Department 
stores? Fashion store? Accessible? Affordable? 
Enough food and clothing for 
themselves/family? …) 
▪ Housing (Where? What kind of housing? Gas? 
Water? Electricity? …) 
▪ Transport (Own transport? Public transport? 
Affordable? …) 
▪ Safety (Safe to go into the street? …) 
▪ Integration (Language barriers? Funny looks? 
Treated differently? …) 
▪ Medical assistance (Hospital? Family doctor? 
Availability medication? …) 
▪ Education (Primary/secondary/university? 
Childcare? …) 
▪ Recreation (Things to do? What is allowed and 
what not? …) 
▪ ICT infrastructure (Internet? Telephone? 
Computer? Radio? Reliability? …) 
▪ Family (Differences when someone arrives on 
his own or with his entire family? ...) 
▪ Is there a difference in availability of facilities 
for members of a combating group and 
‘ordinary’ residents? 
 
Development: 
▪ How did this develop in 2014/did any changes 
occur in that respect? 
 
Region: 
▪ Answer the questions above for A) life on the 
front line and B) life in conquered rebel area. 
Can you give an 
explanation? 
 
Could you give a couple of 
examples of that? 
4. Any additions (on the initiative of the respondent) 
Any themes, not yet discussed, of interest within the framework of daily life in Syria?  
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5. Assessing the likeliness of certain scenarios (based on what has been discussed) 
Question (research questions) Clarifying questions 
▪ How likely do you think it is for someone who travelled to Syria or 
Iraq in 2014 or who intended to do so, did so or intended to do so for 
reasons other than to fight? 
▪ How likely do you think it is for someone who travelled to Syria or 
Iraq in 2014 and ended up with a combat group, not to be personally 
involved in the armed conflict. 
▪ How likely do you think it is for someone who travelled to Syria or 
Iraq in 2014 to end up with a group other than ISIS? 
Can you give an explanation? 
 
Could you give a couple of examples 
of that? 
6. Rounding off the interview 
▪ Final additions made by respondent; 
▪ Thanking the respondent. 
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